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Hawaiian Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the Hawai'i Supreme Court reaffirmed the preeminence of
Hawaiian custom and usage in State law with its decision in Public Access
Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission ("PASH").' In
what many view as a landmark decision, the court held that a public interest
group with Native Hawaiian members had standing to participate in a county-
level contested case hearing because Native Hawaiian interests are distinct
from those of the public at large.2 The court further held that land titles in
Hawai'i confirm only a "limited property interest as compared with typical
land patents governed by Western concepts of property" so that Native
Hawaiians will retain rights with regard to undeveloped land, to pursue
traditional activities.3
Certain large landowners, developers, and title insurance companies
strongly objected to the PASH court's clarification of the scope and content
of traditional and customary usage and mounted a backlash in a series of bills
in the 1997 session of the Hawai'i Legislature. Some of these interests
claimed that the court's decision interpreting Hawai'i's constitutional and
statutory provisions for Native Hawaiian rights unduly encumbered landown-
ers' private property interests.4 Specifically, they alleged that the rights of
Native Hawaiians to access undeveloped land for various religious, subsis-
tence, or cultural purposes "has led to difficulties in selling, buying, and
t 79 Hawai'i 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1559 (1996)
(Mem.)[hereinafter PASH]. This case is discussed in detail in Part II.B, infra. The author added
'Okina, or glottal stops, to all Hawaiian words regardless of Bluebook format.
2 See id. at 434, 903 P.2d at 1255 n.10. The term "Native Hawaiian," or Kanaka Maoli,
as used in the context of this article, refers to individuals able to trace their ancestry to the
peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands prior to the arrival of Captain James Cook in 1778,
regardless of blood quantum Both the "N" and the "H" are capitalized (similar to "Native
American") to signify that the indigenous people of Hawai'i have a status unique from other
inhabitants of these islands.
3 See id. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268.
" See generally S. 8: Relating to Land Use, 19th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997) [herein-
after SB 8]; H.R. 1920: Relating to Real Property, 19th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997) [here-
inafter HB 1920]. Draft copies, testimony, committee reports, and other information pertaining
to bills from the Hawai'i State Legislature's 1997 session are located in the Legislative
Reference Bureau Library at the Hawai'i State Capitol.
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financing real property in the State of Hawai'i." Those interests also
contended that the court's reaffirmation of Native Hawaiian rights created a
state of "uncertainty" which led to "an immediate and direct negative impact
on employment opportunities, personal income, and the economic and social
welfare of all of Hawai'i's citizens."7
In the legislative hearings that followed, advocates and practitioners of
Native Hawaiian traditions defended their rights on historical and legal
grounds. Those countering the backlash explained that the protection of
customary practices was and is necessary for the perpetuation of Hawaiian
culture and lifestyles in an evolving society.8 This coalition asserted that the
State constitutional and statutory provisions on Native Hawaiian rights had a
historical basis in laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom that clearly reflected unique
"background principles" of property in Hawai'i.9
This polarized disagreement over the content and extent of private property
rights and uses in the islands exploded at the beginning of the 1997 legislative
session. Political leaders introduced bills in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to regulate the exercise of traditional and customary uses.1"
In the numerous hearings that ensued, all interests furiously debated the
legality and limitations of State regulation of traditional and customary rights.
In an attempt to understand the intricacies of this debate, this Comment
examines the fundamental differences in Western and Native Hawaiian
property concepts and laws in Hawai'i as it relates to certain legislative
proposals introduced in reaction to PASH. Parts II and lII trace the legal
development of Native Hawaiian rights from their historical evolution in the
Kingdom of Hawai'i to their current codification in Article XII, Section 7 of
the Hawai'i Constitution, and Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") sections 1-1
and 7-1. These sections also detail 137 years of judicial interpretation of these
rights, from Oni v. Meek" in 1858 through PASH in 1995. Parts IV, V, and
VI analyze the impetus for, and legal merits of, recent legislative attempts to
5 Haw. H.R. 1920 at 3.
6 Id.
7 Id.
' See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 8-9, 656 P.2d 745,750(1982) (recognizing
that certain Native Hawaiian rights enable the "legal" practice of traditional activities in
contemporary society). See generally testimony presented in opposition to SB 8 and HB 1920
for the arguments presented in support of traditional and customary uses.
' See PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 451,903 P.2d at 1272. It is important to note that all references
to the "Hawaiian Kingdom" relate to Hawai'i under the rule of the Kamehameha and Kalakaua
Dynasties (from 1785-1893). Prior to Kamehameha the Great's violent unification of the
islands in 1785, ali'i (chief or chiefs) independently ruled islands or groupings thereof.
10 Although this Comment focuses on SB 8 and HB 1920, opponents of traditional and
customary uses made other attempts to restrict these rights. See infra notes 172, 220.
" 2 Haw. 87 (1858). See discussion infra Part ll.D.
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regulate and re-define Native Hawaiian rights. This Comment concludes that
the protected status of Native Hawaiian rights, as codified by the Legislature
and interpreted by Hawai'i's judiciary, reflects unique Hawaiian social and
legal relationships to real property. In light of this history, regulatory attempts
by the legislature to circumvent its fundamental duty of respecting and
accommodating traditional and customary practices violates current laws,
undermines judicial integrity, and threatens Hawaiian culture.
fl. THE LEGAL EVOLUTION OF NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS
In an attempt to better understand the backlash against PASH and disagree-
ments over concepts of property in Hawai'i, this Comment provides an
overview of Native Hawaiian rights. A summation of early Hawaiian land
tenure principles, as well as the text and background of two statutory
provisions, establishes the basis for early protections of traditional and
customary uses in Hawai'i. Due to the myriad of cases interpreting various
aspects of Native Hawaiian rights, this Comment also provides those decisions
helpful in understanding the transition from early statutory protections to the
1978 constitutional provision.
A. Concepts and Laws Relating to Land Tenure in Eighteenth Century
Hawai 'i
Hawai'i's concepts and laws relating to land tenure are unique within
United States law. 2 Much of this difference is attributable to the islands' dis-
tinct cultural and historical background." Hawai'i was an independent nation
before the United States invaded the islands in 1893. Although the constitu-
tional monarchy governing the Kingdom at the time of its illegal overthrow
had imported principles similar to Western property law, those precepts were
not a wholesale adoption of foreign law; rather, they were a unique blend of
principles that evolved from Hawaiian customs and traditions.14
Prior to the documented arrival of Westerners to Hawaiian shores in 1778,
the prevalent system of land tenure was an intricate and interdependent
arrangement based on land use and control." Native Hawaiians lived in
reciprocity with the 'aina ("land base"), which they believed would sustain
2 See PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 442-47,903 P.2d at 1263-68. (distinguishing characteristics of
property law in Hawai'i, due to the unique culture of the islands); In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314,
316, 440 P.2d 76,77 (1968).
13 See Ashford, 50 Haw. at 316, 440 P.2d at 77.
14 See PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 442-47, 903 P.2d at 1262-68.
1s See Maivan Lam, The Imposition of Anglo-American Land Tenure Law on Hawaiians,
23 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 103, 103-06 (1985)[hereinafter Imposition].
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them if properly respected and cared for.16 The land was not commodified and
could not be bought or owned. 7 Under the pre-contact system, the 'aina was
an embodiment of the akua (god or gods)."i As direct descendants of the
akua, Native Hawaiians were responsible for utilizing the 'aina in ways that
respected that relationship and benefited everyone. 9
For the most part, the social structure and resource management of the
mokupuni ("island") divided the 'aina like pieces of a pie; boundaries
followed natural land divisions and stretched from the mountains down to the
sea.20 Mokupuni were divided into. moku ("districts"), which in turn
comprised ahupua'a ("land units").2' Each ahupua'a was further subdivided
into 'ili ("individual farming parcels").'
A socially stratified political system resembling a pyramid managed the
various land divisions such that leadership positions increased in number as
they decreased in rank.23 At the top of the pyramid was the akua.' Below the
akua was an ali'i class, headed by a mo'i.25  The mo'i appointed loyal
16 See LuLjA KAME'ELEIH1WA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PONO
A? 23-25 (1991). Native Hawaiian legend explains that the Hawaiian islands are the children
of Papa, the Earthmother, and Wakea, the Skyfather. The same legend further explains that the
Hawaiian race descended from Wakea and Ho'ohokukalani. Kanaka Maoli ("Native
Hawaiians") therefore view the 'aina as an older sibling, and in accord with custom, believe that
it is the duty of the elder sibling (the land) to care for and feed the younger sibling (the
Hawaiian race), which in turn will respect and care for it. See DAVID MALO, HAWAIIAN
ANTIQUrTIES 241-44 (1961).
" See Neil M. Levy, Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 CAL. L. REV. 848, 849 (1975).
18 See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 26.
"9 See id The term "pre-contact" refers to any point in time prior to the arrival of Captain
Cook in 1778.
2 See id at 27-28. Ahupua'a ("land districts") often included parts of the shore and/or sea.
Id.
21 See P. NAHOA LUCAS, A DICTIONARY OF HAWAAN LEGAL LAND TERMS 77 (1995)
[hereinafter DICTIONARY]. According to Lucas, moku could be divided into kalana or okana
(used interchangeably). See id. at 47, 81-82. These divisions were used selectively on only
certain islands and usually comprised several ahupua'a. See id.
2 See MAW, supra note 16, at 16-18. Although ahupua'a were usually further subdivided
into 'ili, there were exceptions, and some ahupua'a did not contain 'ili. LUCAS, DICTIONARY
supra note 21, at 4. There were also many different types of 'ili, i.e. 'ili ku ("'ili for the mo'i,
not the konohiki"), 'ili kupono ("independent land division, not considered part of the
ahupua'a"), 'ili lele ("parcels of land located in different parts of the ahupua'a, usually used
for cultivating crops"). Id. at 40-41.
23 Despite the stratification of society, Native Hawaiians viewed each other and the 'aina
as part of one extended family. See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 24-25.
2 See id. at 26, 51. The term akua is also plural, as Hawaiians recognized more than one
god or goddess. Physical embodiments of these akua were found in and on the earth (i.e.,
different kinds or plants or fishes). See MALO, supra note 16, at 81-87.
2 See Melody K. MacKenzie, Historical Background in NATIVE HAWAnAN RIGHTS
HANDBOOK 3-4 (Melody K. MacKenzie ed., 1991). The term mo'i describes the highest ranking
324
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followers within the ruling class (i.e. ali'i 'ai moku, ali'i 'ai ahupua'a,
konohiki) to manage individual ahupua 'a or moku.26 These ali 'i directed the
maka 'ainana, a class of resident tenants, in its care of the land."'
Pre-contact society was largely communal in the sense that maka'ainana
cultivated both marine and terrestrial resources of the ahupua'a to provide for
their communities of relatives, both close and distant.' Although individuals
were responsible for specific tasks, all members of society shared access to the
natural resources necessary for survival.29 Those who cultivated kalo ("taro")
shared with others who tended the lokoi'a ("fishpond"), as well as those who
raised 'uala ("sweet potato"). Although individuals had their own house
plots, they utilized and were responsible for other resources of the ahupua'a
beyond the boundaries of their kuleana. ° Specifically, maka'ainana enjoyed
numerous rights, including access to public areas of an ahupua'a, lots for
cultivating food, shared use of water for wet-land and dry-land crops, fishing,
hunting, and gathering rights, as well as the right to erect structures for
sleeping, cooking, eating, storage, and camping.3
Maka'ainana did not own the land they tended in a "fee simple" sense.32
Instead, they occupied land managed by an agent of the mo'i and paid taxes
in the form of goods and/or labor.33 This relationship was mutually beneficial
ali'i and may be defined as king, monarch, or sovereign. Mo'i often describes ali'i of the
Kamehameha dynasty (i.e., Kamehameha I, Kamehameha I) and may not have been used until
the 1800's. See SAMUEL H. ELBERT & MARY KAWENA PUKU'I, HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 251
(1986).
26 See Maivan Lam, The Kuleana Act Revisited: The Survival of Traditional Hawaiian
Commoner Rights in Land, 64 WASH. L. REv. 233, 239-40 (1989)[hereinafter Kuleana Act].
Although ali'i managed various land divisions they did not "own" the land in a "fee simple"
sense.
27 See id. at 240-41.
28 See MacKenzie, supra note 25, at 4.
29 See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 27.
30 See Lam, Kuleana Act, supra note 26, at 242-44. Kuleana is literally translated as
"responsibility." The term also describes the plot of land that maka'ainana lived on and were
responsible for. See ELBERT AND PUKU'I, supra note 25, at 179.
"' See Lam, Imposition, supra note 15, at 106. Native Hawaiian oral history and tradition
also provide evidence of customary use rights. For example, hula practitioners recited He
Kanaenae no Laka, a forest chant in praise of Laka ("goddess of the hula"), when gathering
grasses, herbs, and other forest greenery. See THE ECHO OF OUR SONG: CHANTS & POEMS OF
THE HAWAuIANS 42-47 (Alfons L Korm & Mary Kawena Puku'i eds. & trans., Univ. of Hawai'i
Press 1973). Chants also provide documentation of kahuna (experts) gathering herbs for
medicinal purposes. See JUNE GuTMERis, NA PULE KAHIKO: ANCIENT HAWAEIAN PRAYERS 34
(1989).
32 See Levy, supra note 17, at 848-49.
33 See Lam, Imposition, supra note 15, at 105-06. Despite some similarities, the pre-contact
system of land tenure in Hawai'i differs from European feudalism in the sense that the
maka'ainana were not tied to the land and did not owe military service to the ali'i. See id.
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in the sense that the mo'i and his or her agents served as intermediaries for the
common people by managing resources and making political decisions on
their behalf ' In return, the maka 'ainana provided for the basic needs of the
ali 'i.35 Although either party could disregard its responsibilities, this was not
a common occurrence.36 If a konohiki was cruel or abusive, the maka'ainana
were free to move to another district.37 Conversely, an ali'i could evict or kill
a maka'ainana who was not fulfilling his or her tasks. 38 Despite the fact that
the maka'ainana did not own the land they occupied, they were "fixed
residents" 9 and often had more security than the ali'i. If a new ali 'i came to
power as a result of natural death or warfare, control of the land was usually
redistributed without displacing the maka'ainana.'°
B. The Imposition of Change
Subsequent to Captain Cook's arrival in 1778, Western influences heavily
strained the pre-contact system of land tenure, placing an additional demand
for goods on the maka'ainana. Foreign vessels sought provisions to stock
their ships, and by 1810 a growing market for the export of sandalwood also
developed.4' As these demands increased, communities became less able to
meet their own needs because ali'i pressured the maka'ainana to gather
sandalwood instead of maintaining the subsistence resources of the
ahupua 'a.42 The ali'i, meanwhile, accumulated growing debts by purchasing
merchandise from merchants and traders on credit.43 Most importantly, newly
introduced diseases decimated the Native Hawaiian population; limited
contact with bacteria and viruses common elsewhere increased the impact of
foreign diseases on Hawaiians."
These factors are important because they created an interdependent facet in the relationship
between maka'ainana and a/i'i and discouraged exploitation. See id This distinction is critical
when applying feudal land concepts to Hawai'i.
See MALO, supra note 16, at 52-63.
" See id.
36 See Lam, Kuleana Act, supra note 26, at 240-42.
" See id
38 See MALO, supra note 16, at 57, 61. Likewise, maka'ainana could kill or replace cruel
or abusive ali'i. See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 26.
39 MALO, supra note 16, at 61.
40 See KAME'EEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 51-52 (describing the politics of Kalai'aina, or
"land redistribution").
41 See 1 RALPH S. KUYKENDAII, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 82-86 (1938)[hereinafter
KUYKENDALL, HAWAIIAN KINGDOM].
42 See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 140.
43 See KUYKENDAuL, HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, supra note 41, at 90-91.
" See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 140-41. Scholars disagree over the population
of Hawai'i at the arrival of Captain James Cook. Lt. James King, one of Cook's crew members
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While the native population struggled to maintain its health and way of life,
foreign traders and merchants tried repeatedly to collect sandalwood debts.
Eventually, warships from the note holders' home countries came to induce
payment.45 Foreign demands for land also mounted as newly arrived sailors,
merchants, and missionaries sought parcels in lease or fee.' Maka'ainana
were also evicted as ali'i traded or lost their lands to foreigners.47
In attempt to quell the scramble for land and the disenfranchisement of the
maka 'ainana, Kauikeaouli, the reigning mo'i also known as Kamehameha III,
promulgated a Declaration of Rights in 1839 and Hawai'i's first Constitution
in 1840.48 The Declaration of Rights purported to protect the interests of all
inhabitants of the Hawaiian Kingdom. 49  It provided protection for
maka 'ainana independent of the ali'i.50 The Constitution of 1840 affirmed
this guarantee and, with regard to land tenure, declared that the mo'i held all
of the land in the islands in trust for the ali'i and maka 'ainana and that no
land could be conveyed without Kauikeaouli's consent.51 Despite the
promulgation of these laws, the disputes over land continued.
After the British seized control of the Kingdom for six months in 1843,
Kauikeaouli, under pressure from his foreign advisors, made another effort to
secure the sovereignty of his nation and a land base for his people.52 In 1845,
he created a Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles to delineate the
scope and outcome of all land claims.53 After reviewing the land tenure
estimated the population as 500,000 (although he later amended that figure to 400,000). See
DAVID STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPULATION OF HAWAI'I ON THE EvE OF
WESTERN CONTACT 3 (1989). Because of King's limited contact with the islands, especially
the heavily populated wetland regions, later scholars utilizing more comprehensive sociological
data, conservatively estimated a population of 800,000 to one million. See id. at 78. In 1823,
a census completed by missionaries recorded 134,925 Native Hawaiians. See KAME'ELEIHIWA,
supra note 16, at 81. By 1893, this figure dropped to roughly 40,000. See id. at 20.
45 See KUYKENDALL, HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, supra note 41, at 91-92.
4 See id. at 137.
41 See Lam, Imposition, supra note 15, at 107.
4 See Levy, supra note 17, at 851. Kauikeaouli (or Kamehameha III) was a son of
Kamehameha I, who consolidated political control over the Hawaiian islands in a single
Kingdom in 1785. Kauikeaouli ruled as mo'i from 1825-54, transforming the Kingdom into a
constitutional monarchy and adopting private property rights in land. KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra
note 16, at 31, 169-98. See generally id at 205-06 (describing the social conditions surround-
ing laws passed in the 1840's).
49 See LORRIN A. THIuRTN, THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OFHAWAII 1 (1904); See generally
RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM: A BRIEF HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 8 (1940)[hereinafter KUYKENDAL, CONSTITUTIONS].
o See THURSTON, supra note 49, at 1.
51 See id. at 3.
52 See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 184-86.
53 See Commission to Quiet Land Titles; Awards, Patents; Etc. art IV, sec. 1, 2 REVISED
LAWS OF HAWAI'I 2120 (1925)[hereinafter REV. LAws].
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system, the Commissioners instituted a process for settling all land claims in
the Kingdom.54 Despite the creation of this Commission, few claims were
resolved until the interests of the mo'i, ali'i, and the maka'ainana were
separated three years later.55
After tremendous debate, the mo'i, his foreign advisors, and the Privy
Council, made a collective decision to institute a system of fee simple
ownership whereby the mo'i and ali'i would receive title to individual
parcels.56 In what became known as the Mahele of 1848, Kauikeaouli first
reserved 'aina for himself.5 7 The ali'i then quit-claimed their interests in
Kauikeaouli's properties, and he relinquished his interest in theirs.5" Ali'i
were also required to petition the Land Commission and pay a commutation
fee in order to receive a title deed.59 The maka'ainana did not participate
directly in the Mahele; instead, Kauikeaouli gave 1.5 million acres to the
government "subject always tothe rights of native tenants. ' 6°
Due in part to the continuing displacement of the maka'ainana even after
the Mahele, Kauikeaouli instituted the Kuleana Act of 1850. Under this Act,
maka'ainana could receive fee simple title to the lands they occupied and
improved without a commutation fee.61 Section 7 of the Kuleana Act, also
provided grantees with rights to gather, access, and obtain water from other
parts of the ahupua'a.62 Kauikeaouli wrote and included section 7 due to his
concern that a "little bit of land even with allodial title, if they [the people] be
54 See JON CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAwAI'I's LAND DIVIsION OF 1848 9, 12 (1958).
5 See id. at 12.
56 When Kauikeaouli reorganized the Kingdom into a constitutional monarchy, he made the
Privy Council, formerly a council of all'i, part of the executive ministry. The council acted in
both an advisory and legislative capacity and consisted of five people: the governors of O'ahu,
Maui, Hawai'i, Kaua'i, and one other member appointed by the mo'i. See KUYKENDAU,
HAWAIAN KINGDOM, supra note 41, at 263.
57 See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 210.
s See CHINEN, supra note 54, at 15-16.
5 See Principles Adopted by the Land Commission, 2 REV. LAWS 2136 (1925).
60 Crown, Government, and Fort Lands, Enumerated Etc.: An Act Relating to the Lands
of His Majesty the King and the Government, 2 REV. LAWS 2174 (1925). Because initial land
divisions in the Hawaiian Kingdom took place without "settling" the interests of maka'ainana,
some individuals maintain that Kanaka Maoli able to trace their ancestry to subjects of the
Hawaiian Kingdom prior to 1893, who did not participate in the Mahele of 1848 or Kuleana Act
of 1850 or otherwise compromise their Kingdom citizenship, continue to hold an undivided
interest in all land in the State of Hawai'i. Interview with Keanu Sai, Title Abstractor, Perfect
Title Company, in Honolulu, Haw. (Apr. 9, 1997).
6 See Act of August 6, 1850, 2 REV. LAWS 2141 (1925). The Kuleana Act placed
restrictions on the type and amount of land available to maka'ainana. See id.
62 See id. at 2142.
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cut off from all other privileges, would be of very little value."6 This section
thus provided kuleana occupants with a legal guarantee of unencumbered
access within their ahupua'a to utilize resources necessary to make their
kuleana productive." Although the konohiki's permission was initially
required before a tenant could exercise these rights, the legislature eliminated
this condition during its next session due to "difficulties and complaints" of
interference with the free exercise of maka 'ainana rights.65
Despite these and other efforts to preserve the rights of Native Hawaiians
and allow continued exercise of traditional and customary practices amidst the
rapid changes in Hawaiian society, developing Western influences made
ancestral lifestyles increasingly less viable.6 Many Native Hawaiians,
however, incorporated traditional and customary practices into their
contemporary lifestyles and continue to perpetuate their culture in various
ways. While some Hawaiians remain reliant on these practices for daily
subsistence, others pursue traditional practices for purely recreational
purposes.
C. Early Statutory Protection of Traditional and Customary Uses by the
State of Hawai'i
Two statutory provisions: HRS 1-1 and 7-1 partially enable the continued
practice of traditional and customary uses, as discussed in Part I.B above. On
the eve of statehood in 1959, the Admission Act made "[a]ll Territorial laws
in force in the Territory of Hawai'i at the time of its admission into the Union
... continue in force in the State of Hawai'i[.] 67 Because the 1900 Organic
Act similarly adopted the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom as those of the
63 Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Company, 66 Haw. 1, 7, 656 P.2d 745, 749 (1982)(quoting
Privy Council Minutes of July 13, 1850).
" See Paul N. Lucas, Access Rights, in NATIvE HAWAIIAN RIGTS HANDBOOK 214 (Melody
K. MacKenzie, ed. 199 1)[hereinafter Access Rights].
65 See Act of July 11th, 1851, SESSION LAWS OF 1851 at 98-99. The prelude to the
amendment stated in part, "WHEREAS, many difficulties and complaints have arisen, from the
bad feeling existing on account of the konohiki's forbidding the tenant's on the lands enjoying
the benefits that have been by law given them[.]" Id.
Maka'ainana received only about 28,658 acres in awards out of 1.5 million, or a fraction of
one percent of the total land area of the islands. See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 16, at 295.
66 See Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 7, 656 P.2d at 749.
67 The Admission Act, 48 U.S.C., Ch. 3 § 15 (1987). Section 15 of the Admission Act also
allowed for the modification or repeal of Territorial laws. See id. The Territory adopted both
HRS sections 1-1, 7-1 as codified.
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Territory,6 HRS 1-1 and 7-1 actually codify for the State various acts of the
legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 1-1 provides that:
The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions,
is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawai'i in all cases, except as
otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or
established by Hawaiian usage; provided that no person shall be subject to
criminal proceedings except as provided by the written laws of the United States
or of the State.69
This section codifies "custom" in Hawai'i, subordinating English and
American common law to traditional and customary Hawaiian practices. In
addition, it expressly accedes to judicial precedent of the Kingdom of Hawai'i.
This substantial deference is due to the defining role that custom played in
early Hawaiian law.7°
The State also provides a second statutory protection for traditional and
customary practices. Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 7-1 declares that:
Where the landlords have obtained, or may hereafter obtain, allodial titles to
their lands, the people on each of their lands shall not be deprived of the right to
take firewood, house timber, aho cord, thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on which
68 See An Act to Provide a Government for the Territory of Hawai'i (Organic Act) §§ 6, 10,
32, Act of Apr. 30, 1900, c. 339,31 Stat. 141 (2 Supp. R.S. 1141)(1988).
69 HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (1995)(emphasis added).
70 Although Polynesian voyagers settled in Hawai'i as early as 700 A.D., custom and usage
governed the Kingdom almost exclusively until the promulgation of the Declaration of Rights
in 1839. See 1 STATUTE LAWS OF His MAJESTY KAMEHAMEHA III, KING OF THE HAwAIIAN
ISLANDS 3 (1845-46). As the transition to a more "Western" system of government continued,
lawmakers codified oral traditions and laws in written form. On September 7, 1847, in section
IV of An Act to Organize the Judiciary Department of the Hawaiian Islands, the Judiciary was
free to adopt and apply common law as long as those principles were "not at conflict with the
laws and usages of the Kingdom." 2 STATUTE LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY KAMEHAMEHA III, KING
OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 5 (1847). When the Kingdom prepared a Civil Code in 1859,
section 14 included "received usage" as a source of law. See CIVILCODE ch. 3 § 14 (1859). On
November 25, 1892, the Kingdom reorganized the Judiciary, repealing the relevant section in
the 1859 Civil Code and adopting language similar to that found today in HAW. REV. STAT. §
1-1. See SESSION LAWS ch. LVII, § 5 (1892). The original language, however, referred to the
common law and Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands, "or fixed by Hawaiian judicial
precedent, or established by Hawaiian national usage[.]" Id. As explained above the Organic
Act of 1900 made ch. LVII, § 5 applicable to the Territory. See supra note 68. When
government officials reorganized and compiled the laws of the Territory in 1905, that statute
became chapter 1, section I of the Revised Laws of Hawai'i. See REVISED LAWS OF HAW. ch.
1, § 1 (1905). The deference to Hawaiian usage since the origin of written law in Hawai'i
provides a clear rationale for the present subordination of common law in Hawai'i to Hawaiian
custom and usage.
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they live, for their own private use, but they shall not have the right to take such
articles to sell for profit. The people shall also have a right to drinking water,
and running water, and the right of way. The springs of water, running water,
and roads shall be free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple; provided that
this shall not be applicable to wells and watercourses, which individuals have
made for their own use.7'
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 7-1 makes section 7 of the Kuleana Act
of 1850 applicable in the State of Hawai'i, therefore preserving the rights of
ahupua 'a tenants to gather enumerated items for personal use and to access
other portions of the ahupua'a.72 This section also vests ahupua'a tenants
with rights to adequate water for cultivating crops.
D. Early Judicial Interpretations of Native Hawaiian Rights
Oni v. Meek,73 decided in 1858, was the first Hawai'i Supreme Court case
to review the scope of rights under section 7 of the Kuleana Act, which is now
codified as HRS 7-1."4 Oni brought suit to recover the value of two horses
pastured in the uplands of the ahupua'a of Honouliuli.7 5 Dr. Meek held three
leases giving him title to the uplands of the ahupua'a; he seized and sold
Oni's horses while they were on his property.76 Oni presented two legal bases
for his right to pasture: (1) custom; and (2) an 1846 statutory provision-
substantially similar to the Kuleana Act-providing tenants a limited right to
pasture animals on lands held by the konohiki of an ahupua 'a."
71 HAw. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (1995).
72 Chapter XXXIV, section 1477 of the Civil Code of 1859 included the Kuleana Act of
1850. The actual text of that statute (after the amendment repealing the konohiki permission
provision) was identical to what is now HRS section 7-1, although the government listed it in
various sections of the Revised Laws (see e.g., REv. LAW. 1925 § 576; REV. LAW. 1935 § 1694;
REV. LAw. 1945 § 12901; REV. LAw. 1955 § 14-1). Regardless of its location, the legislative
intent of the provision was clearly to protect the traditional and customary rights of
maka'ainana within the private property regime. See discussion supra Part II.B.
73 2 Haw. 87 (1858).
74 See Lucas, Access Rights, supra note 64, at 214. The Supreme Court of the Kingdom of
Hawai'i (as opposed to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i) decided Oni. The Supreme
Court of the State of Hawai'i since clarified that decision in Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Company,
66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
" See Oni, 2 Haw. at 87.
76 See id. The last of a series of leases reserved certain portions of the uplands of
Honouliuli. The defendant thus held title to all of the mauka ("upper") land in the ahupua'a,
except that reserved in the last lease. Id. at 87-88.
' See id. at 89-92. The law passed on November 7, 1846, but it was never expressly
repealed by the legislature; it provided:
The rights of the hoa'aina ["tenant"] in the land consist of his own taro patches, and all
other places which he himself cultivates for his own use; and if he wish [sic.] to extend
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The court rejected both arguments. First, the court ruled that the Kuleana
Act of 1850 implicitly repealed earlier statutes governing the same areas of
law.7" Second, the court stated that "the custom contended for is so unreason-
able, so uncertain and so repugnant to the spirit of the present laws, that it
ought not to be sustained by judicial authority." '79 In dismissing Oni's
argument that he received permission from Meek's predecessor-in-interest, the
konohiki, and was continuing to maintain his rights and duties as a tenant, the
court ruled that Oni's fee simple title freed him from any duty to labor as well
as "the enjoyment of any right or privilege, and if he performs such labor it is
neither by force of law or custom, but in fulfillment of a private contract."'
The court finally held that the fee simple title claim of a konohiki, or lessee
thereof, prevailed over all rights except those expressly reserved by section 7
of the Kuleana Act.8
Oni construed the Kuleana Act as the exclusive source of rights reserved to
ahupua'a tenants.82 The court also relied heavily on Western property
concepts, questioning custom as a basis for establishing traditional uses.83 The
Hawai'i Supreme Court later clarified this ruling after Article XII, Section 7
of Hawai'i's Constitution was adopted. 4
Although Oni dealt with the scope of rights provided by HRS 7-1, the court
did not consider the issue of access under that statute until 1968.85 In Palama
his cultivation on unoccupied parts, he has a right to do so. He has, also, rights in the
grass land, if there be any under his care, and he may take grass for his own use or for
sale, and may also take fuel and timber from the mountains for himself. He may also
pasture his horse and cow and other animals on the land, but not in such numbers as to
prevent the konohiki from pasturing his. He cannot make an agreement with others for
the pasturage of their animals without the consent of his konohiki, and the Minister of the
Interior.
Id. at 91-92. The court went on to state that:
[i]t was evidently the intention of the Legislature that whenever, in any case, a tract of
land was divided between the several parties in interest, those rights which they had
previously held in common, while their interests in land were undivided, should cease to
be so held.
Id. at 93.
78 See id. at 94.
79 Id. at 90.
o Id.
0' See id. at 94-95.
8 See id. at 95-96.
8' See id. at 90-91.
" In Kalipi v. Hawaiian Tnust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982), the court interpreted
Oni as rejecting the validity of a particular exercise of custom (as opposed to custom in general).
See id. at 11, 656 P.2d at 751. The court also noted that Oni did not restrict Native Hawaiian
Rights to those enumerated in HRS section 7-1. See id.
8 See Lucas, Access Rights, supra note 64, at 215.
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v. Sheehan,86 the Palamas filed a quiet title action to a sixty-acre parcel of land
known as "Nomilo Pond" in the ahupua'a of Kalaheo, on Kaua'i."7 The
property contained an eighteen-acre fishpond, and the Sheehans claimed
fishing rights in the pond and access to a kuleana they owned in the same
ahupua'a based on Hawaiian rights, and necessity."8
The trial court denied the Sheehan's fishing claim but granted them access
across the Palama's property via an existing right of way.89 On appeal, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court affirmed the grant of access on the basis of both
native rights and necessity.90 The court noted that access was established as
a matter of Native Hawaiian right because the Sheehan's predecessors-in-
interest used the right of way to travel from their kuleana to taro patches
located elsewhere in the ahupua'a.9' The court further observed that although
a footpath initially provided access, the Palama's predecessor-in-interest
expanded the trail to accommodate vehicles. 92 The court thus allowed the
Sheehans to use contemporary methods of transportation rather than limiting
access to technology available at the time a right of way was established.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court also decided In re Ashford93 in the same year
that it handed down Palama. The Ashfords petitioned the land court to
register title to beach-front parcels on the island of Moloka'i.94 The Ashfords
maintained that the seaward boundaries of the parcels were the mean high
water mark.95 The State alternatively claimed an additional twenty to thirty
feet, explaining that the seaward boundary of beach front properties was the
line at which vegetation began to grow, "in accordance with tradition, custom,
and usage in old Hawai'i." 96
Noting that Hawai'i's land laws are unique, the court ruled on behalf of the
State.97 The court emphasized the importance of resolving contemporary
disputes by considering historical data9 and explicitly stated that "[p]roperty
rights are determined by the law in existence at the time such rights are
86 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95 (1968).
s See id. at 298,440 P.2d at 96.
88 See id.
'9 See id. at 299, 440 P.2d at 97. This Comment does not address the issue of fishing rights
in Palama.
90 See id. at 301,440P.2dat98.
9' See id. at 301,440 P.2d at 97-98.
92 See id. at 303, 440 P.2d at 99.
93 50 Haw. 314,440 P.2d 76 (1968).
94 See id. at314,440P.2dat76.
9' See id. at 314,440 P.2d at 77.
96 Id at 315, 440 P.2d at 77. The Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled that during the Kingdom,
the vegetation or debris line marked the seaward boundary of parcels. See id
9" See id at316,440P.2dat77.
98 See id.
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vested."" The court thus evaluated the legitimacy of current claims, in part,
based on the establishment of such a claim in "old Hawai'i. ' 1°°
In 1977, the court reinforced this position in State ofHawai'i v. Zimring.101
In this action, the State sought to quiet title to 7.9 acres of land added to the
Zimring's parcel by a 1955 lava flow." The Zimrings opposed the State's
claim on the grounds that Hawaiian usage prior to 1892 gave the owner of
beach front land title to any additions created by lava flows. 3
After considering doctrines of Hawaiian custom and usage, the court held
that "lava extensions vest when created in the people of Hawai'i, held in
public trust by the government for the benefit, use and enjoyment of all the
people."'' 4 The court rejected the Zinrings' attempt to establish a claim via
- Id. at 317,440 P.2d at 78 (citations omitted).
100 Id. at 315, 440 P.2d at 77. In 1973, the court again looked to HawaiTs history to
interpret Native Hawaiian rights in McBryde Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504
P.2d 1330 (1973), adhered to on reh'g, 55 Haw. 260,517 P.2d 26 (1973), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1974), and cert. denied, Robinson v. Hawai'i 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
In McBryde, two sugar companies in Hanapepe Valley on the island of Kaua'i were dueling
over rights of water use. McBryde contested the amount of water Gay & Robinson diverted and
sought a court order to determine the amount.of each company's entitlement. After examining
Hawaiian laws and customs relative to water management, the court held that the State (with a
position analogous to the moo'i) had primary responsibility (or "ownership") for all of the water
in Hawai'i. See id. at 199-200, 504 P.2d at 1345. Although individuals could acquire rights
to use water, they could never own it. See id. at 200, 504 P.2d at 1345. The court also held that
individuals could not transport water out of the watershed. See id. Although the decision was
consistent with Hawaiian custom and tradition, the sugar companies claimed that the ruling
controverted Western property law in Hawai'i and pursued a reversal in both the state and
federal court system for almost twenty years. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Unraveling
Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts Take Property?, 2 U. HAw. L. REV. 57 (1979)(detailing the
litigation surrounding the McBryde decision in the state and federal courts). See also
Williamson B.C. Chang, Reversals of Fortune: The Hawai'i Supreme Court, the Memorandum
Opinion, and the Realignment of Political Power in Post-statehood Hawai'i, 14 U. HAW. L.
REv. 17 (1992)(explaining how judges familiar with the culture and history of Hawai'i
reinterpreted certain laws after statehood).
101 52 Haw. 472,479 P.2d 202 (1970)[hereinafterZimring I], rev'a 58 Haw. 106,566 P.2d
725 (1977)[hereinafter Zimring I]. The court remanded this case and separate trials were
conducted to decide various issues. This summation deals only with the 1977 Hawai'i Supreme
Court decision as it relates to traditional and customary usage.
'o See Zimring II, 58 Haw. at 107, 566 P.2d at 727.
103 See id. at 109, 566 P.2d at 728-29. Although the trial court found that "Hawaiian usage
prior to 1892 gave the owner of land along the seashore, title to land created by volcanic
eruption when the eruption destroyed the pre-existing seashore boundary and formed a new
boundary along the sea," id. at 110, 566 P.2d at 729, the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that the
Zimrings failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the custom. See id. at 116, 556 P.2d
at 732.
104 Id. at 121, 556 P.2d at 735.
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the government's actions (Boundary Commission Report and Royal Patent)."°5
instead, it explained that traditional and customary uses do not hinge on
government acceptance, but "must be based on actual practice[.] 'J" 6 The court
further observed that customary uses must be established in practice by
November 25, 1892.107
From 1838 to 1977, the Hawai'i Supreme Court interpreted HRS 1-1 and
7-1 as providing protections for traditional and customary uses, access, water,
and gathering. In light of those decisions, current uses will qualify as
protected traditional and customary rights if they: 1) were established in
practice by 1892; 2) were actually exercised; and 3) have a basis in Hawaiian
social and/or legal history. The court also expressed a willingness to
incorporate the practice of traditional and customary uses into contemporary
settings and to resolve disputes over whether or not a use was protected by
looking at Hawaiian history.
m. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECrIONS OF 1978
Despite the courts' recognition of traditional and customary rights,
decisions from both the Kingdom of Hawai'i and the first twenty years of
statehood limited the scope and content of Native Hawaiian rights. Although
the State judiciary interpreted HRS 1-1 and 7-1 more broadly than Kingdom
courts, rights of access, gathering, and water were modestly protected." s With
the passage of a constitutional amendment in 1978, however, the court's
affirmation and protection of Native Hawaiian rights increased notably.
A. The Constitutional Amendment
In 1978, the people of Hawai'i amended several provisions of the State
Constitution in a Constitutional Convention. One hundred and two delegates,
with a wide range of backgrounds and interests, took part in the
105 See id at 116-18, 556 P.2d at 732-33. After the Mahele, the Minister of the Interior for
the Kingdom of Hawai'i issued Royal Patents for Land Commission Awards "upon payment of
commutation by the awardee to the government, usually set at one-third the value of the
unimproved land at the time of the award." Id. at 111, 556 P.2d at 730. In 1862, a Boundary
Commission was statutorily created and empowered to issue reports determining the boundaries
of land awarded in the Mahele and Kuleana Act, if the borders were not previously defined. See
id. at 117-18, 556 P.2d at 733.
'06 Id. at 117, 556 P.2d at 733.
'0o See id. at 116, 556 P.2d at 732 n.11 (citing State ofHawai'i v. Zimring, 52 Haw. at 472,
479 P.2d at 202 (1970)). November 25, 1892, is the date on which the Hawaiian Kingdom
passed the predecessor to HRS 1-1. See supra note 70.
'0' See discussion supra Part II.D.
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proceedings. °9 Among the delegates existed a "genuine feeling that the
Hawaiian culture and people were the host people of this state... and as such
should be protected above and beyond others."'" 0 In response to specific
concerns about access and gathering rights, delegates made a concerted effort
to raise current statutory protections to a constitutional level, thereby making
traditional and customary uses an "inviolate right." '' After being drafted in
the Convention, and ratified by Hawai'i's voters, Article XII, Section 7 now
mandates that:
The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally
exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by
ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the
Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such
rights. 1
12
This section places an affirmative duty on the State to respect and preserve
traditional and customary rights. Delegates included Article XII, Section 7 to
"preserve the small remaining vestiges of a quickly disappearing culture""' 3
by recognizing that traditional and customary rights are "personal rights...
inherently held by Hawaiians and do not come with the land."" 4  The
legislative history of the Amendment further delineates that, due to recent
attempts to prevent practitioners from "following subsistence practices
traditionally used by their ancestors,".. 5 it was necessary to "provide the State
with power to protect these rights and to prevent any interference""' 6 with
them. Delegates thus granted the State regulatory authority "to prevent
possible abuse as well as interference with these rights.""' 7 Since the adoption
of Article XII, Section 7, the Hawai'i Supreme Court's interpretation of this
provision significantly expanded the scope of protections for traditional and
customary rights.
"0 Interview with Charlene Hoe, Delegate to the 1978 Constitutional Convention, in
Honolulu, Haw. (Mar. 2, 1997).
110 Id.
11 Telephone Interview with Sheri Broder, Attorney for the Hawaiian Affairs Committee
in the 1978 Constitutional Convention (Apr. 22, 1997). Broder also explained that the
amendment represented a "community-wide sentiment." Id. "People felt it was the time to start
the process of beginning to provide justice for Native Hawaiians." Id.
112 HAW. CONST. art. XII § 7.
113 STAND. COMM. REP. No. 57, reprinted in 1 Proceedings of the Con. Convention of 1978,
at 640 (1980).
114 Id. at 639-40.
'" Id. at 639.
116 Id.
117 Id. The State's ability to regulate traditinal and customary uses is limited. See discussion
supra Part V.C.
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B. Judicial Interpretation of Native Hawaiian Rights Subsequent To
Article XII, Section 7
After the 1978 Constitutional Convention and the ratification of Article XII,
Section 7, judicial interpretations of Native Hawaiian rights began to reflect
the State's duty to affirm and protect traditional and customary uses. In Kalipi
v. Hawaiian Trust Company,' the plaintiff claimed rights of access and
gathering under HRS 1-1 and 7-1, and a reservation in the deeds of title for
certain lands on the island of Moloka'i." 9 William Kalipi was a resident of
the ahupua 'a of Keawenui who owned a taro patch in Manawai and a house
lot in East Ohia.' 2 Although Kalipi was raised and had resided on the East
Ohia lot, he was not living there when he filed suit.' Yet, he claimed a right
to continue his family tradition of accessing the lands of the defendants to
gather various natural resources."
On appeal from a verdict in favor of the defendants, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court declined to reverse the lower court's decision." Although the court did
not address Article XLI, Section 7 directly, it acknowledged its constitutional
obligation, finding that "it is this expression of policy which must guide our
determinations."' 24 The court further stated that despite the possibility of
conflict, "any argument for the extinguishing of traditional rights based simply
upon the possible inconsistency of purported native rights with our modem
system of land tenure must fail."'25 The court thus examined the issues
involving Native Hawaiian rights with deference to the State's duty to protect
customary rights.
After noting that HRS 7-1 conferred rights of access, gathering, and water,
the court went on to evaluate Kalipi's gathering rights under that section as
one of first impression. 26 After reviewing the historical and legal aspects of
the pre-contact system of land tenure, the court stated that section 7 of the
Kuleana Act was included for use by the maka'ainana to "ensure the
utilization and development of their lands.""' Thus, "lawful occupants of the
ahupua 'a may, for the purposes of practicing Native Hawaiian customs and
traditions, enter undeveloped lands within an ahupua'a to gather those items
n8 66 Haw. 1,656 P.2d 745 (1982).
"1 See id. at 4, 656 P.2d at 747.
120 See id. at 3, 656 P.2d at 747.
121 See id.
122 See id Some of the items gathered by Kalipi and his family were ki, bamboo, kukui nuts,
kiawe, medicinal herbs and ferns. See id. at 4, 656 P.2d at 747.
123 See id.
124 Id. at 5, 656 P.2d at 748.
'2' Id. at 4, 656 P.2d at 748.
126 See id. at 5, 656 P.2d at 748.
127 Id. at 7, 656 P.2d at 749.
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enumerated in the statute." ''2 Because Kalipi was not currently living in the
ahupua'a in which he sought to exercise traditional and customary practices,
the court did not enforce his rights.129 The court finally acknowledged that
gathering rights were necessary for the perpetuation of traditional and
customary practices and "thus remain, to the extent provided in the statute,
available to those who wish to continue those ways. '' 3°
In assessing Kalipi's claims under HRS 1-1, the court articulated a
balancing test whereby the retention of a Hawaiian tradition is determined first
by deciding if a custom has continued in a particular area, and second, by
balancing the respective interests of the practitioner and harm to the
landowner.' In promulgating this test, the court rejected the defendant's
claims that the only Native Hawaiian rights that remained in existence after
the Mahele of 1848 were those specifically identified in HRS 7-1 .132 The
court also clarified Oni as a rejection of a particular custom, pasturage, as
opposed to custom in general. 3 3 The court thus interpreted HRS 1-1 as "a
vehicle for the continued existence of those customary rights which continued
to be practiced and which worked no actual harm upon the recognized
interests of others. ' 134
In 1992, the Hawai'i Supreme Court directly addressed the range of
protections provided by Article XII, Section 7, and HRS 7-1 in Pele Defense
Fund v. Paty 35 In Pele, members of a non-profit corporation ("PDF') formed
to perpetuate Hawaiian religion challenged as a breach of trust the State's
exchange of 27,800 acres of ceded lands, including the Wao Kele '0 Puna
Natural Area Reserve, on the island of Hawai'i, for 25,800 acres in
Kahauale'a from Campbell Estate.1 36 The members of Pele Defense Fund
further claimed that denial of access for gathering and religious purposes by
owner Campbell Estate, True Energy Geothermal, Corp., True Geothermal
Id. at 7-8, 656 P.2d at 749. The court defined "lawful occupants" as individuals residing
in the ahupua'a in which they seek to exercise traditional rights. Id at 8, 656 P.2d at 749. The
decision also acknowledged that the State has an interest in regulating gathering activities. See
id.
129 See id. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751.
132 See id. at 11-12, 656 P.2d at 751-52.
133 Seeid at 11,656P.2d at 751.
134 Id. at 12, 656 P.2d at 752.
135 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1277 (Mem.)(1993).
136 See id. at 584, 837 P.2d at 1253. The mechanism for admitting Hawai'i as part of the
United States, the Admission Act, established a trust for lands owned by the Kingdom of
Hawai'i at the time of the overthrow. The Act named the State government administrator of that
trust and the Native Hawaiian people one of five beneficiaries. See id. at 584-86, 837 P.2d at
1253-54.
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Drilling Co., and Mid-Pacific Geothermal Inc. violated Article XII, Section
7.137
On appeal from the Third Circuit's judgment in favor of the defendants, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. 3 After ruling
that PDF's claim for breach of trust was barred, 139 the court turned its
attention to the group's access and gathering rights.""4 The court first granted
PDF standing under Article XII, Section 7, due to its purpose of encouraging
Hawaiian religion.' 41 The court then proceeded to "further explicate" the
scope of rights protected by that provision.
142
After reviewing Kalipi, the court noted that although PDF had constitu-
tional and statutory basis for their claims similar to Kalipi, Kalipi had
predicated his legal argument on land ownership, while PDF based its claim
on custom and usage. 14 3 In examining the range of protection for customary
rights the court reviewed the legislative history of Article XII, Section 7.44
The court likewise noted that the provision sought "to protect the broadest
possible spectrum of native rights"'45 and contemplated the extension of some
traditional rights beyond the ahupua 'a.
46
Pele acknowledged Kalipi's mandate that a reviewing body determine the
"precise nature and scope" of rights on a case-by-case basis.1 47  After
considering the traditional and customary access and gathering practices in
Puna, the court held that "Native Hawaiian rights protected by Article XII,
Section 7 may extend beyond the ahupua'a in which a Native Hawaiian
resides where such rights have been customarily and traditionally exercised
137 See id. at 584-85, 837 P.2d at 1253.
138 See id. at 585, 837 P.2d at 1254. The decision was also remanded back to the Third
Circuit to decide whether the landowners should be enjoined from denying PDF access. See id.
Although proposed findings of fact were submitted by both parties, no decision was made as of
November 6, 1998. Telephone Interview with Carl Christenson, Native Hawaiian Legal Corp.,
Attorneys for Pele Defense Fund (Nov. 6, 1998).
"9 See Pele, 73 Haw. at 590, 837 P.2d at 1256. Although the court found that PDF had
standing to pursue a claim for breach of trust, it ruled that the statute of limitations, res judicata,
and sovereign immunity barred the claim. See id.
40 See id. at 613, 837 P.2d at 1268.
141 See id. at 614, 837 P.2d at 1268. The court ruled that PDF had standing to pursue its
Article XII, Section 7 claim because: (1) its members included Native Hawaiians injured by
their exclusion from the plaintiffs land; (2) such injuries are traceable to alleged violations of
"Kalipi rights;" and (3) injunctive relief allowing Native Hawaiians to access undeveloped lands
would remedy the injuries. See id. at 615-16, 837 P.2d at 1269.
142 See id. at 616, 837 P.2d at 1270.
141 See id. at 618-19, 837 P.2d at 1271.
'44 See id. at 619-20, 837 P.2d at 1271-72.
141 Id. at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271.
'4 See id. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272.
'47 See id. at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271.
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in this manner."'48 Although the court's holding in Pele was consistent with
both traditional and contemporary laws and usage, it significantly expanded
the legal protections for customary use rights.
In Pele, the court distinguished customary rights based on usage from those
based on land ownership.'49 In evaluating use rights, the court examined the
establishment of the custom in the context of the immediate community, rather
than employing island-wide standards. The court also gave considerable
weight to the mandate of Article XII, Section 7, electing to expand the scope
of rights provided by Kalipi instead of prohibiting an established use."5
Most recently, the court re-examined the scope of the statutory and
constitutional protection of Native Hawaiian rights in PASH.'' The public
interest group PASH and a Native Hawaiian Angel Pilago opposed the
application of the Japanese-owned development corporation, Nansay, for a
county-level Special Management Area ("SMA") Use Permit to develop a
resort complex in the ahupua'a of Kohanaiki, on the island of Hawai'i' 52
After holding a public hearing, the Hawai'i County Planning Commission
refused to hold a contested case hearing for PASH and Pilago on the grounds
that their interests were not "clearly distinguishable from that of the general
public." '153 Instead, the Planning Commission denied their request and issued
Nansay a SMA permit.54 PASH challenged this ruling in the Third Circuit
Court, which reversed the Commission's decision and remanded the case to
the Planning Commission for a contested case hearing.151 On appeal, the
Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court decision with respect
to PASH but reversed it with respect to Pilago.' After considering Nansay's
appeal, the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that: 1) the circuit court had
jurisdiction to consider the claims; 2) PASH had standing, so a contested case
141 Id. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272. This distinction from Kalipi stemmed from the nature of
traditional practices in Puna as well as the scope of protection available under Article XII,
Section 7. Although the court in Kalipi deferred to the policy of X11-7, it based its ruling on
both HRS sections 1-1, 7-1. See Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 4-12, 656 P.2d at 747-52.
149 See Pele, 73 Haw. at 618-19, 837 P.2d at 1271.
0 See id. at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271.
'' 79 Hawai'i 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995).
152 See id. at 429, 903 P.2d at 1250.
153 Id.
"4 See id. at 430, 903 P.2d at 1251.
155 See id.
156 See id. The appeals court reversed with respect to Pilago in spite of his "special" interest
as a Native Hawaiian because he did not assert that he or other Hawaiians were engaging in
protected activities, and thus failed to show that his interest was "personal." Public Access
Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 246, 254, 900 P.2d 1313,
1321 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993). See also PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 430,903 P.2d at 1251 (explanation
in Hawai'i Supreme Court decision).
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hearing should be held; and most importantly 3) Native Hawaiians retain
rights to pursue traditional and customary activities, as land patents in Hawai'i
confirm only a limited property interest, when compared with Western land
patents/concepts of property. 57
Upon examining Article XII, Section 7, and HRS 1-1 and 7-1, the court
observed that neither Kalipi or Pele precluded further inquiry into the extent
that Native Hawaiian rights endured under State law. 5 After considering the
practices at hand, the court ruled that Article XII, Section 7 is binding on
administrative agencies-in that case, the Hawai'i County Planning
Commission- and obligates those agencies to protect traditional and customary
rights previously limited to state and county governments.'59
The court devoted considerable attention to the extent that HRS 1-1
preserved customary practices, noting that Kalipi specifically refused to
decide the "ultimate scope" of traditional rights under that statute.' 6' The
court also distinguished the doctrine of custom in Hawai'i in several
respects.' 6 ' First, contrary to the "time immemorial" standard used by English
and American common law, 62 traditional and customary practices in Hawai'i
must be established in practice by November 25, 1892.163
Second, the court articulated a three-point test for the doctrine of custom,
requiring that a custom be consistent when measured against other customs,
a practice be certain in an objective sense, and a traditional use be exercised
in a reasonable manner.'" Defining the reasonable use requirement, the court
further explained that the balance leans in favor of establishing a use in the
sense that "even if an acceptable rationale cannot be assigned, the custom is
still recognized as long as there is no 'good legal reason' against it.'
' 65
157 See PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 425, 903 P.2d at 1246. The opinion in PASH is extraordinarily
detailed. This section will not address all of the specifics of the decision (i.e., CZMA
requirement, standing), and instead will focus on the sections relevant to traditional and
customary uses under Article XII, Section 7, and HRS sections 1-1, 7-1.
158 See id. at 438, 903 P.2d at 1259.
"9 See id. at 437, 903 P.2d at 1258.
160 See id. at 439, 903 P.2d at 1260.
161 See id. at 447-51, 903 P.2d at 1268-72.
162 The "time immemorial" standard requires that a custom exist as far back as can be
remembered. It is also described as "time whereof the memory of man is not to the contrary."
BLACKS LAW DICIoNARY 1483 (6th ed. 1990).
163 See id. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268 (citations omitted). Under English and American
common law, a custom "must appear to have existed from time immemorial; to be reasonable,
to be certain, and not inconsistent with the laws of the land." Oni v. Meek, 2 Haw. 87, 90
(1858). See supra note 70 (development of HRS section 1-1). November 25, 1892 is the date
on which the Hawaiian Kingdom passed the predecessor to HRS section 1-1. See supra note
70.
'64 See PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.39.
165 Id.
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Third, the court declined to limit the exercise of traditional and customary
rights to individuals of Native Hawaiian descent. In a footnote, the court
refused to decide whether descendants of citizens of the Kingdom of Hawai'i
who were not of Native Hawaiian descent could assert rights protected by
HRS 1-1.6 The court also "expressly reserve[d] comment" on whether non-
Hawaiian members of an 'ohana could claim rights under Article XII, Section
7.167
In addition to affirming Kalipi and Pele, PASH also highlighted several
nuances in traditional and customary rights. The court expressly declined
Nansay's invitation to overrule Pele and instead reaffirmed the decision,
stating that the mandate of Article XII, Section 7, "normally associated with
tenancy in an ahupua 'a, may also apply to the exercise of rights beyond the
physical boundaries of that particular ahupua'a."'16' The decision also
recognized that Native Hawaiians have a unique claim to traditional and
customary rights under HRS 1-1 and XI-7. 6 Yet, the court did not view this
independent claim as foreclosing non-Hawaiians from exercising protected
uses. Finally, the court's decision emphasized the historical basis for
traditional and customary rights, the role of background principles of property
in evaluating current uses, and the distinction between Hawaiian and English
or American custom.
Since the addition of Article XII, Section 7 in 1978, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court's decisions increasingly reflect the State's solemn duty to preserve
Native Hawaiian rights. This renewed commitment to Hawaiian principles
and uses is not an abstract creation. It reflects the judiciary's respect for the
populace's effort to acknowledge Hawai'i's unique history by enshrining it in
a constitutional provision.
IV. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS To REGULATE NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS
The court's interpretation of statutory and constitutional provisions relating
to Native Hawaiian rights since Oni in 1858 significantly increased the scope
of protection for traditional and customary uses. Cases decided since the
adoption of Article XIL Section 7 of the Constitution in 1978 also exhibit the
court's willingness to fulfill its duty to affirm and protect these rights.
Because the United States Supreme Court declined to review PASH, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court's interpretation of Article XII, Section 7, and of HRS
1-1 and 7-1, is final until it is modified by either the State or Federal Supreme
166 See id. at 449, 903 P.2d at 1270 n.41.
167 Seeid
" Id. at 448, 903 P.2d at 1269.
'6 See id at 449, 903 P.2d at 1270 ("Customary and traditional rights in these islands flow
from Native Hawaiians' preexisting sovereignty.").
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Court. 7 ' Despite this finality, dissidents attempted to limit the continued
exercise of Native Hawaiian rights by promoting legislation that would restrict
the implementation of the PASH decision. In light of the statutory and
constitutional protections for traditional and customary practices, this
Comment examines the legitimacy of recent regulatory attempts.
Opponents launched a backlash in a series of bills introduced during the
1997 legislative session to dilute the impact of recent court decisions.
Legislators focused on the "uncertainty" created by PASH and presented bills
to "remedy" the situation. 7' Senate Bill 8 ("SB 8") and House Bill 1920
("IB 1920") spearheaded these attempts to dilute the judiciary's rulings in the
legislature. 72
A. Overview of SB 8
Senator Randy Iwase (D-district 18: Wahiawa, Mililani) pre-filed SB 8 on
January 15, 1997. This bill sought to provide private landowners with
assurance of property title by instituting a process of determining and
registering all traditional and customary uses exercised on a parcel of land.'73
Senate Bill 8 proposed that no legal exercise of traditional or customary
practices could occur unless a practitioner was issued a "Certificate of
Registration of Native Hawaiian Right.' ' 174  Individuals interested in
continuing customary practices would have been required to initiate and
complete a process of petitioning for and establishing any traditional and
customary uses.
Senate Bill 8 attempted to amend HRS chapter 205, extending the authority
of the Land Use Commission ("LUC" or "Commission") to resolve all Native
Hawaiian claims. 75 Under SB 8, practitioners would have borne the burden
o70 The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari to review PASH
on April 22, 1996. See Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning
Commission, 116 S. Ct. 1559 (1996)(Mem.).
'7 See HB 1920 (justifying legislative intervention to address the "uncertainty" caused by
PASH).
172 See SB 8; HB 1920. Senate Bill 8 and HB 1920 were not the only bills introduced during
the 1997 legislative session that affected or restricted traditional and customary rights. Senate
Bill 668, for example, sought to expand HRS section 7, including protections for traditional and
customary gathering rights. This analysis will focus on SB 8 and HB 1920, however, because
they represent popular approaches to regulate traditional and customary rights.
173 See SB 8.
14 See id. § 205-B(a), at 4.
'71 See id. Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 205 established a nine-member Land Use
Commission ("LUC"), appointed by the Governor. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 205-1 (1995). The
LUC must 1) establish standards for district boundaries (§ 205-2(a)), 2) approve all boundary
amendments for parcels larger than 15 acres, see §§ 205-3.1(a), 205-4, 3) review special use
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 20:321
of establishing, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that (1) they were
descended from individuals that inhabited the Hawaiian islands prior to 1778
(via a genealogy chart), and (2) that the traditional and customary practice
they wished to continue was established on the identified parcel of land prior
to November 25, 1892, by the petitioner's ancestors, via documents or
records. 76 Senate Bill 8 required supplementation of this information with the
petitioner's name, address, list of lineal descendants, and a description of the
land on which she or he sought to continue practicing. 177 The bill required
that applicants file all information with the LUC.171
Senate Bill 8 also specified that the Commission notify a landowner that it
received a petition via certified mail or publication, within thirty days of
filing.179 The landowner could respond to the petition and request a contested
case hearing within a reasonable period.8 If the landowner responded
accordingly, a contested case hearing would have been held in conformity
with the Hawai'i Administrative Procedure Act.' If the landowner failed to
respond, the Commission could issue a certificate granting the practitioner
access "over, across, or upon the undeveloped land"'82 if the use was
reasonable and would not "cause hardship to the landowner and pose an
unreasonable restriction on the landowner's intended use of the property."'8 13
The Commission might, however, impose conditions on the practitioner to
prevent "unreasonable activities that may interfere, impede, or hinder the
private landowner's use or possession of the undeveloped land."'1 4 The LUC
could also terminate or modify certificates upon the petition of the landowner
and a showing that the use "caused hardship" or was an otherwise "unreason-
able restriction."185
permits for parcels larger than 15 acres, see § 205-6. The commission may also initiate
boundary amendments to ensure conformity with the various state and county development and
community plans. See id. § 205-18.
176 See SB 8 § 205-B(b), at 4-5.
'7 See id. § 205-C(b), at 5-6.
,78 See id § 205-A, at 2.
'79 See id. § 205-C(c)(1), at 6-7. The LUC must place the advertisement in a newspaper of
general circulation for at least two successive weeks on the island on which the undeveloped
land is located. See id. at 7.
'80 See id. § 205-C(c)(2), at 7.
18 See id. The Hawai'i Administrative Procedure Act ("HAPA") establishes minimal
procedural requirements for all State and County administrative bodies when promulgating rules
or adjudicating contestated cases. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 91 (1995 & Supp. 1997). The Act
also provides for the judicial review of final agency decisions or orders. See id. § 91-14.
82 SB 8 § 205-C(c)(2), at 7.
183 Id. § 205-D(a), at 8.
4 Id. § 205-B(d), at 5.
185 See id § 205-D(a), at 8. The modification/termination process resembled the petitioning
process, but did not specify whether the landowner or practitioner bore the burden of proof. The
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Moreover, the Commission would only consider petitions for parcels of
"undeveloped land."1 6 Senate Bill 8 limited this definition to property upon
which no structure or improvement existed, and no grading, grubbing, or
building permit was issued. s7 The bill also classified paths, walkways, and
greenways as improvements, thus making parcels where they existed ineligible
for traditional and customary uses.' s If an individual currently exercised
traditional or customary uses on lands that did not fall within SB 8's definition
of undeveloped land, that usage was not eligible for registration, and therefore
could not be legally continued.
After being introduced and having passed its first reading on January 15,
1997, the Speaker referred SB 8 to the Senate Committee on Water, Land, and
Hawaiian Affairs.8 9 Co-chairs for the Committee, Randy Iwase and Malama
Solomon (D-district 1: Kohala, Kawaihae, Honoka'a, Laupahoehoe, Papai-
kou), scheduled the bill for a hearing on February 4, 1997. Although nearly
forty individuals submitted written testimony, an additional twenty arrived at
the hearing to present oral testimony."9' Several classes of high school
students also attended and submitted petitions in opposition to SB 8.
Over 90% of the testimony presented at the hearing opposed the bill's
passage. Of the individuals supporting SB 8, almost all mentioned the burden
the PASH decision imposed on Hawai'i's landowners. Interestingly enough,
only one large landowner, Estate of James Campbell, presented oral testimony
in support of the bill. The remainder of the supporters represented develop-
ment interests, title insurance firms, and construction companies.
A wide range of interests opposed the bill. Scholars and practitioners from
the Native Hawaiian community presented vigorous opposition. Native
Hawaiian rights lawyers, environmental lawyers, and law students also
attended. Finally, non-Hawaiian citizens concerned about SB 8's negative
effects on all of Hawai'i's residents also encouraged the senators to let the bill
die in committee.
modification process also provided for a public hearing with the option of requesting a contested
case hearing, if the certificate holder responded within a reasonable time. If a certificate holder
failed to respond, the petitioner's rights were deemed modified or terminated. See id. § 205-
D(c)(1-3), at 9-10.
186 See id. § 205-B(a)(4), at 4. See also id. § 205(A), at 3-4.
'87 See id. § 205-A, at 3-4.
188 See id Senate Bill 8's requirements made it extraordinarily difficult to establish a use.
For example, although the bill mandated that a practitioner establish continued use of a parcel,
the existence of a path made the parcel "developed" and thus ineligible for traditional and
customary uses.
189 STATE OF HAWAI'! LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 19TH LEGIs. SESS., ALL
INFORMATION FOR A BILL (SB 8) 1 (Haw. 1997).
190 The author witnessed SB 8 and KB 1920's proceedings as a legislative extern and
participant in the committee hearings.
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Due in part to the significant amount of testimony submitted, the co-chairs
deferred action on SB 8. On Tuesday, February 11, 1997, Senator Iwase
announced two amendments to the bill in Senate Draft One of SB 8. The first
amendment added the Office of Hawaiian Affairs as a party to all contested
case hearings in order to help determine what uses were traditional and
customary. The second amendment allowed landowners and petitioners to
make settlement agreements at any time during the registration process. In a
unanimous vote, the Senate Committee on Water, Land, and Hawaiian Affairs
passed SB 8 that afternoon, referring the bill to the Senate Committee on
Ways and Means. 9'
While the bill was pending in Ways and Means, a new coalition of powerful
Hawaiian interests formed in opposition to the bill."9 Hula practitioners
concerned about the impact of regulatory efforts like SB 8 on Hawaiian
culture and lifestyles came together as 'Ilio'ulaokalani.193 On February 25,
1997, the coalition held a twenty-four-hour vigil at the State Capitol to
191 The Senate Committee on Water, Land, and Hawaiian Affairs passed SB 8 with a vote
of 4 ayes, and 5 ayes with reservations.
"9 Telephone Interview with Victoria Holt-Takamine, 'lio'ulao kalani (Apr. 24, 1997).
'9' See id '11io'ulaokalani literally translates as "the Red Dog Of the Heavens." Yet, there
are many different levels of translation and the name also refers to a type of cloud formation,
"a kind of watch cloud that hovers over and keeps track of things." Id. 'Jlio'ulao kalani is a
coalition of hula halau ("hula schools") and their extended 'ohana committed to preserving
Hawaiian culture and traditions. Telephone Interviews with Victoria Holt-Takamine,
'lio'ulaokalani (Apr. 24, and Aug. 13, 1997)(all information relating to 'Jlio'ulaokalani was
gathered in a series of interviews with Victoria Holt-Takamine). This unification of powerful
local interests was created at the start of the 1997 legislative session in response to SB 8 and
other legislation affecting Hawaiians and Hawaiian issues. Due in part to a lack of
representation by and consideration for traditional and customary practitioners, about a dozen
kumu hula from around Hawai'i gathered on O'ahu in February of 1997 to discuss several bills
that threatened to further restrict Native Hawaiian culture and traditions. The coalition's
founding members included island notables like Pua Kanahele, Robert Cazimero, Keali'i
Reichel, and Victoria Holt-Takamine.
After the coalition's instrumental role in stopping SB 8, about a dozen "core members"
continued to meet on a weekly basis. Realizing 'Ilio'ulaokalani's incredible potential to
"promote Hawaiian culture and things that are Hawaiian," the coalition began hosting
educational forums and continued tracking bills. Id. Having started with monetary donations
from various hula halau and other Hawaiian organizations, the coalition continues to operate
via grants and other contributions. 'flio'ulaokalani remains active: it has a mailing list
numbering over 1100 individuals and a calendar with events already scheduled for the year
2000. Future plans include fundraising, study groups, and informing and mobilizing voters for
upcoming elections.
As kumu hula from around the islands keep in contact through 'Ilio'ulaokalani, more and
more groups are turning to the coalition for political and strategic support. In addition to
providing direct input on issues, 'lio'ulaokalani now serves as a network for community efforts
around the islands. As the coalition supports actions to protect "things Hawaiian," they fulfill
the legacy of their name by watching over and keeping track of things. See id.
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demonstrate dissatisfaction with SB 8, urging the Ways and Means' co-chairs
to let the bill die in committee.194 On Wednesday, after the demonstrators
refused to let Senators Iwase and Solomon explain their positions, Solomon
killed the bill by dramatically ripping it to pieces in front of the crowd. 95
Some spectators were unimpressed by this display since Solomon voted in
favor of SB 8 and was otherwise unwilling to stop the bill while it was in her
committee.' Despite the fact that the legislature's attempt to enact SB 8 was
short-lived, HB 1920 raised the same issues of customary rights.
B. Overview of HB 1920
Representative Calvin Say (D-district 18: St. Louis Heights, Palolo,
Kaimuki) introduced HB 1920 on January 24, 1997. The explicit purpose of
the bill was to respond to recent Hawai'i Supreme Court decisions that
"dramatically affected the nature of real property in Hawai'i.', 97 Like SB 8,
HB 1920 asserted that the court's affirmation of traditional and customary
rights clouded title and limited landowners' ability to use their property.
98
The bill further explained that the present uncertainty of land titles and
property rights "poses a serious threat to the State's economic and social well-
being."1 99 House Bill 1920 sought to exercise the State's authority under
Article XII, Section 7 of the state constitution to "clarify and regulate" the
practice of traditional and customary uses."
Instead of establishing a registration process, HB 1920 created a declaratory
cause of action that could be initiated in circuit court to "determine the nature
and extent of customary and traditional practices in land."'" Both landowners
and petitioners were eligible to institute such actions.' Finally, any suit
brought under HB 1920 would have had preference over all other civil
actions.2 3
Petitions filed by practitioners required the same types of evidence as SB
8: 1) name and address; 2) documentation proving that the petitioner
descended from individuals inhabiting the Hawaiian islands prior to 1778, via




'97 HB 1920, Section 1, at 1.
198 See id. Section 1, at 1-4.
'99 Id. Section 1, at 2.
2W See id. Section 1, at 3-4.
201 See id. Section 2, § 3, at 6.
202 See id.
203 See id. Section 2, § 3, at 7.
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occupying-as opposed to temporarily residing in- an ahupua'a; 4) a detailed
description of the practice and areas utilized, including tax map parcel, and
owner; and 5) written or other evidence showing that the practice "pre-existed
and was not terminated by the Mahele of 1848, continued to be exercised as
of November 25, 1892, and has been customarily exercised by Native
Hawaiians on the land identified."'  Petitions filed by landowners required:
1) name and address; 2) a specific and detailed description of the land
(including tax map parcel/s); and 3) identification of all potential or actual
persons eligible to claim a right to exercise traditional and customary practices
in the land.' 5
Under HB 1920, after the judge issued a summons, potential claimants as
well as known claimants who, after due diligence could not be served, could
have been served by publication.' The bill required that notice be published
in an English language newspaper of general circulation in the circuit where
the action was filed, once a week for at least four weeks.' 7 House Bill 1920
also required posting a copy of the summons on the land involved in thelitigation .208
The bill also empowered judges to issue default judgments against all
individuals who failed to respond to the summons.' 9 Otherwise the judge
could schedule trials where either party contested the petition.210 Individuals
claiming traditional and customary practices bore the burden of establishing
their claim by a preponderance of the evidence.2 ' Practitioners had to
affirmatively demonstrate that their practice was "reasonable" and would not
result in "actual harm" to other interests, in addition to substantiating the
elements of their petition.21 2
At the conclusion of this process, the bills charged the courts with
determining the "nature and extent," if any, of customary and traditional
practices. 2 '3 House Bill 1920 further authorized courts to issue decrees with
204 See id. Section 2, § 2-4, at 4-9.
205 See id Section 2, § 4(b)(1-3), at 8. In all documents provided by both practitioners and
landowners HB 1920 also required that, to the best of the person's knowledge, the information
provided was true. See id. Section 2, § 4(c), at 8-9.
206 See id. Section 2, § 5(b), at 8-9.
207 See id. Section 2, § 5(b), at 9-10.
208 See id. Section 2, § 5(b), at 10.
2 See id. Section 2, § 5(c), at 10.
210 See id. Section 2, § 6, at 10-11.
21 See id. Section 2, § 7, at 11.
212 See id.
213 See id. Section 2, § 8, at 12.
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the effect of a final judgment."" The court could also impose conditions on
existing uses, when the decree was issued, or in the future.215
House Bill 1920 additionally made certain types of land unavailable for
traditional and customary uses. These lands included: 1) all land zoned
urban; 2) physically altered land, or parcels improved by grading, grubbing,
landscaping, or agricultural activities; 3) land covered by quiet title; and 4)
land registered pursuant to HRS chapter 501.216
Finally, HB 1920 relieved State and County agencies of their duty to
consider the impact of their actions on traditional and customary rights.
Although the bill purported not to affect the proceedings of any agency, 17 the
bill provided that agencies fulfilled their obligation to protect traditional and
customary uses under Article XII, Section 7 of Hawai'i's Constitution if they
exercised authority subject to customs "subsequently established or proceed-
ing under this chapter."18 The bill explained that if an agency exercised
discretionary authorization or granted a permit subject to traditional and
customary practices, as established, or being decided under HB 1920, the
agency fulfilled its constitutional duty to protect such rights and did not have
to independently review the proposals impact on tradition.1 9
214 See id.
215 See id. House Bill 1920, unlike SB 8, required that landowners demonstrate a cause for
modification of existing rights by a preponderance of the evidence.
216 See id. Section 2, § 11, at 14-15. An individual may institute a Quiet Title action,
codified as HRS section 669, to establish legal title to parcels of five acres or less, where the
person seeking tide was in adverse possession for at least twenty years. See HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 669-1 (1995). Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 501 established a Land Court with the
"exclusive original jurisdiction of all applications for the registration of title to land and
easements or rights in land held and possessed in fee simple within the State[.]" HAw. REv.
STAT. § 501-1 (1993). Grubbing is part of the land clearing process to prepare for development
and usually involves removing trees, shrubs, or bushes. Telephone interview with Wilford
Kiyotoki, Engineer, City and County of Honolulu Dept. of Public Works (Jan. 6, 1998).
217 See HB 1920 Section 2, § 10, at 14.
218 See id.
219 See id. If passed, HB 1920 would place all responsibility for settling traditional and
customary uses with the circuit courts, allowing agencies to act without independently
considering the effect of their actions on Hawaiian traditions (if they acknowledged claims
proceeding or settled pursuant to the bill). In light of the Hawai'i Supreme Court's holding in
PASH that State agencies (as opposed to just the State government) are obligated to uphold
Article XII, Section 7, HB 1920 blatantly attempted to circumvent the court's interpretation of
the Constitution by removing the affirmative burden placed on State agencies. See Public
Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425,451,903 P.2d
1246, 1272 (1995).
Section 2, § 11 of the bill, exempting certain lands from customary rights, also worked
against the preservation of traditional and customary rights. House Bill 1920 prohibited the
exercise of traditional and customary uses on fully developed land. See HB 1920 Section 2, §
11(2), at 15. Therefore, the bill did not sanction customary uses on any parcel where "the
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After being introduced and having passed its first reading, the Speaker
assigned HB 1920 to the House Committee on Hawaiian Affairs. Chairman
Ed Case (D- district 23: Manoa) scheduled a hearing on the bill on Thursday,
February 13, 1997. Chairman Case began the hearing by reading Article XII,
Section 7 of Hawai'i's Constitution, HRS 1-1, and excerpts from the PASH
decision. Fifty-seven individuals submitted written testimony for the hearing:
about one-third of the testimony favored the bill, while two-thirds opposed it.
After receiving testimony, the House Committee on Hawaiian Affairs deferred
action on the bill indefinitely, and Chairman Case encouraged those in
opposition and in support of the bill to get together and work out a solution.
C. Other Attempts at Regulation
Despite the fact that SB 8 and HB 1920 did not become law through the
1997 legislative session, the backlash against PASH continues. 2 After both
bills were killed, various interests introduced two resolutions pertaining to the
regulation of traditional and customary rights. House Concurrent Resolution
276 and House Resolution 197 ("HCR 276/HR 197") proposed that the Office
of Planning of the Department of Business, Economic Development, and
Tourism ("DBEDT") facilitate discussions with all interested parties and seek
consensus on the appropriate regulation of traditional and customary rights
under Article XII, Section 7. Representative Case wrote and introduced HCR
276/HR 197. After being offered, the Hawaiian Affairs Committee heard the
resolution and passed it out on March 20, 1997. However, that Committee
natural state has been physically altered, through activities including farming... landscaping,
grubbing, dredging, or grading." Id. Section 2, § 2, at 5. In addition to the significant reduction
in areas available for use, HB 1920, § 10 allowed agencies to make more lands unavailable by
issuing new development permits without considering the impact of its action on any Hawaiian
traditions not yet "settled" by a circuit court. The bill's agency exemption thus enabled the
extinguishment of customary uses, seriously contradicting the letter and spirit of Article XII,
Section 7 as interpreted by this state's highest court.
o The backlash against PASH is also taking place outside the legislative arena. For
example, the Hawai'i County Planning Commission added several new requirements to the
process of requesting contested case hearings. Telephone Interview with Susan Gagorik,
Planner for the Hawai'i County Planning Comm. (Apr. 23, 1997). Effective February 17, 1997,
individuals interested in a contested case hearing must complete a form (and have it notarized),
pay a $100 filing fee, and submit the request seven days before any public hearing on the issue.
See id. In order to establish standing, the individual must either: 1) have a position distinct
from the public at large; 2) be a government agency; 3) have a property interest in or legally
reside on the property in question; 4) establish actual or threatened injury from the proposed
action; or 5) claim a native Hawaiian gathering right. See id. The new requirements are unusual
and may decrease efficiency of contested cases as people are forced to request hearings without
the informational benefit of a public hearing. Telephone Interview with David Henkin,
Attorney, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund (Apr. 23, 1997).
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amended the bill, by including the Department of Land and Natural Resources
to assist DBEDT, and by proposing that monthly progress reports be issued
to individuals interested in the discussions. The House Committees on
Judiciary and Finance also approved the resolution without amendment and
it was later adopted by the full House. The resolution finally crossed over to
the Senate, but neither Senator Iwase or Solomon scheduled the resolution for
a hearing."'
On March 14, 1997 Senate Ways and Means Co-Chairs Carol Fukunaga (D-
district 12: Tantalus) and Lehua Fernandez-Sailing (D- district 7: Lihu'e,
Hanapepe, Waimea, Ni'ihau) introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 230,
with identical text to Senate Resolution 114. Resolution 230 sought to fund
a study of traditional and customary rights, which would be directed by the
William S. Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa,
in consultation with the community-at-large. The resolution requested the
inclusion of 'lio'ulaokalani and student groups representing Native Hawaiian
and other local interests. After being introduced, the Speaker referred the
resolution to the Senate Committee on Water, Land, and Hawaiian Affairs.
Co-Chairs Randy Iwase and Malama Solomon did not schedule the resolution
for a hearing, and it died in committee.
Although Article XII, Section 7 allows for some regulation of traditional
and customary use rights, the debate over the necessity and compatibility of
such regulation with local interests, culture, and law continues.222 In light of
the unsettled nature of this issue, an analysis of SB 8 and HB 1920 provides
insight on what elements of regulation, if any, are acceptable and workable.
V. ANALYZING SB 8 AND HB 1920
Although SB 8 and HB 1920 used different methods to regulate Native
Hawaiian rights, these bills embodied many of the same concepts and utilized
221 The DBEDT took action on HR 197 by appointing fifteen individuals representing Native
Hawaiian, environmental, development, title, and State and County interests to a PASH study
group (current members include: Nathan Aipa, Denise Antolini, Paul Brewbaker, Dan
Davidson, David Forman, Virginia Goldstein, Walter Heen, Victoria Holt-Takamine, Davianna
McGregor, Frances Mossman, David Pietsch, Hannah Springer, William Tam, Dean Uchida,
and Bill Yuen). Telephone interview with Denise Antolini, PASH Study Group Member (Sep.
14, 1997). This assembly began meeting on July 25, 1997 and is hoping to: 1) determine if
traditional and customary rights are a "problem" and if so, the scope of the problem, and 2)
devise a range of dispute resolution models effective in addressing the issue. See id. The group
began presenting its findings to various communities around the islands beginning in October,
1997. See id The group also submitted findings to the state legislature twenty days before the
start of the 1998 session. See id.
222 The State's power to regulate the exercise of traditional and customary rights is limited.
See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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similar definitions and conditions. The following section analyzes the bills'
restriction to Native Hawaiians, restriction to ahupua 'a tenants, definition of
development, and method of proving customary usage before comparing the
administrative and judicial adjudication of claims. SB 8 and HB 1920 will be
simultaneously examined to determine whether they are: 1) constitutional; 2)
in compliance with HRS 1-1 and 7-1; and 3) socially and culturally appropri-
ate.
The three criteria selected for analysis enable a thorough investigation of
the bills by considering the effects and implications of federal laws as well as
principles unique to Hawai'i. These criteria also factor in the practical effects
of current regulatory efforts. Beyond the legal issues, this analysis examines
SB 8 and HB 1920 to determine if they are workable, affordable, and
appropriate.
A. Restriction to Native Hawaiians
Senate Bill 8 and HB 1920 limited the "legal" exercise of traditional and
customary practices to ethnic Hawaiians.' Because Article XII, Section 7 of
Hawai'i's Constitution protects the rights of "descendants of Native Hawai-
223 The restriction to Native Hawaiians predicated SB 8 and HB 1920 on a racial or ethnic
distinction subjecting the bills to Equal Protection challenges under the State and Federal
Constitutions. The United States Supreme Court ruled that any explicitly race-based state action
is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989). In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court went further in holding that "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The State of Hawai'i would
thus have to prove that the bills are "narrowly tailored measures" necessary to achieve a
"compelling governmental interest." Id.
The State may assert that because Native American groups have a distinct political status,
state, or federal governments need only provide a rational as opposed to compelling
governmental objective for utilizing a Native American classification. See Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974)(ruling that reasonable and rationally designed actions targeting a political
class are not invidious racial discrimination). Moreover the State may argue that because the
Hawai'i Supreme Court recognized that Native Hawaiians have a unique political status, use of
this classification is exempt from strict judicial scrutiny. See Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian
Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 640 P.2d 1161 (1982)(analogizing Native Hawaiian status to that
of other Native Americans). Despite this rationale, the State must also consider the fact that the
Federal District Court in Hawai'i limited the use of Native Hawaiians' political status to efforts
of the federal government or state actions under federal law. See Nali'ielua v. State of Hawai'i,
795 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 n.4 (D. Haw. 1990)(ruling that legislation granting preference to
Native Hawaiians does not constitute invidious racial discrimiation), aff'd, 940 F.2d 1535 (9th
Cir. 1991)(Mem.). But see Stewart Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship:
The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 Yale L.J. 537 (1996)(arguing that the trust relationship
between American Indians and the US government does not apply to Native Hawaiians).
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ians[,]" 224 this restriction comported with the language of the state constitu-
tion. The legislative history of the Amendment and passages in PASH,
however, contemplate the extension of traditional and customary rights to non-
Hawaiians.225
Although the text and judicial interpretations of Article XII, Section 7
provide Native Hawaiians with an independent legal basis for traditional and
customary rights, the legislative history also expressed the notion that non-
Hawaiians may exercise certain customs and uses.' While discussing which
rights vested in ethnic Hawaiians as opposed to non-Hawaiians, Frenchie De
Soto, Chair of the Constitutional Convention's Committee on Hawaiian
Affairs, noted that "any right enjoyed by a Native Hawaiian is also truly
enjoyed by those who are non-Hawaiian. If you are fortunate enough to marry
a Hawaiian, certainly you may follow her right down to the beach. 227
Although Article XII, Section 7 of the Constitution provides special protection
for traditional and customary uses exercised by ethnic Hawaiians, it does not
foreclose non-Hawaiians from exercising protected uses.2H Senate Bill 8 and
HB 1920's reservation of customary rights for Native Hawaiians therefore
incorporated the narrowest possible view of Article XII, Section 7 and opened
themselves to constitutional challenge.229
Furthermore, neither HRS 1-1 or 7-1 specify that only Native Hawaiians are
eligible to claim traditional and customary rights under either statute.230 For
224 See Ahuna, 64 Haw. at 327, 640 P.2d at 1161.
See Hearings on S. 8, Relating to Land Use, 19th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 3 (1997)(testimony
of David Lane Henkin, Attorney, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund)[hereinafter SB 8 Hearing].
Henkin explained that "PAS.HIPilago left the door open to the assertion of traditional and
customary rights by 'descendants of citizens of the Kingdom of Hawai'i who did not inhabit the
Hawaiian islands prior to 1778 or by other non-Hawaiians." Id. (emphasis in original).
Professor Williamson B.C. Chang confirmed this position noting, "The Hawai'i Supreme Court
has not confined the benefits of native Hawaiian rights to native Hawaiians as a race or ethnic
group." See SB 8 Hearing, supra at 1 (testimony of Williamson B.C. Chang, Professor of Native
Hawaiian Rights, Univ. of Haw. at Manoa, William S. Richardson Sch. of Law).
226 See COMM. OF THE WHOLE DEBATES, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTTUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAwAI'i OF 1978 at 436 (1980).
22 Id. In light of the Hawai'i Supreme Court's clarification of Article XII, Section 7 in
PASH, the class of non-Hawaiian individuals enabled to practice traditional and customary
rights is arguably broader than those persons married to Native Hawaiians. See infra notes 233-
34 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
229 Exactly which individuals are eligible to exercise traditional and customary rights is
unclear. Although the class of possible practioners is arguably larger than individuals married
to Native Hawaiians, that class is not without limitation. Some Native Hawaiian scholars and
practitioners advocated limiting the class to individuals with a minimal level of training and
expertise. See infra note 253 (statement by Davianna McGregor).
230 See Chang, supra note 225, at 1. Professor Chang characterized SB 8's limitation to
Native Hawaiians as "a fundamental misreading of the State Supreme Court's interpretation of
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example, HRS 1-1 protects customs established by Hawaiian usage. Arguably,
persons of various ethnic or racial backgrounds could exercise uses protected
by that statute, if the custom was established in practice by November 25,
1892.231
In 1892, citizens of numerous ethnic and national extractions inhabited the
Hawaiian Kingdom. Regardless of their descent, subjects of the Hawaiian
Kingdom may therefore have practiced, if not established, usage now
considered traditional and customary.2 32 In PASH, the court declined to limit
the exercise of customary rights to Native Hawaiians and refused to decide
whether descendants of citizens of the Kingdom of Hawai'i who were not of
Native Hawaiian extraction could assert rights under HRS 1_1.233 The court
also "expressly reserved comment" on whether Article XII, Section 7
protected the rights of non-Hawaiian members of an 'ohana.34 Senate Bill 8
and HB 1920 therefore created a limitation that the State of Hawai'i's highest
court, charged with interpreting the constitution, repeatedly declined to
impose.235
The practical effects of limiting traditional and customary uses to Native
Hawaiians would have severely limited the cultural practices of many island
residents. 236 Mixed-race families could no longer legally engage in whole-
group outings, as both bills precluded non-Hawaiian members from participat-
section 1-1 and section 7-1. The Hawai'i Supreme Court has never reserved particular rights
only to native Hawaiians." Id.
"3 The Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled that a use must be established in practice by November
25, 1892, to be considered traditional and customary. See State of Hawai'i v. Zimring, 58 Haw.
106, 116, 566 P.2d 725, 732 n.11 (1977) (citations omitted). See supra Part I.D for additional
explanation.
232 For example, on Moloka'i, the hunting of deer introduced during the 1850's is considered
traditional and customary by many Native Hawaiians, although it was not practiced in Hawai'i
prior to the arrival of Captain Cook in 1778. Telephone Interview with Davianna Pomaika'i
McGregor, Associate Professor in Ethnic Studies, Univ. of Haw. at Manoa (Dec. 18, 1997).
Second, although feral pigs existed in Hawai'i in pre-contact times, it is questionable whether
they were "hunted" in the method commonly practiced today. Id.
" See Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm., 79 Hawai'i
425,449, 903 P.2d 1246, 1270 n.41 (1995).
3 See id
3 See Henkin, supra note 225, at 3. Citing PASH, Henkin noted "to be consistent with the
traditional practice of hanai and the Aloha Spirit, practitioners who are associated with native
Hawaiians by marriage, adoption or other close relationship should enjoy the same protection
as those who can trace their genealogies back to 1778." Id.
236 Telephone Interview with Davianna Pomalka'i McGregor, Associate Professor in Ethnic
Studies, Univ. of Haw. at Manoa (Apr. 24, 1997). Professor McGregor explained that in many
rural communities (i.e., Hana, Maui; Puna, Hawai'i; Moloka'i; Windward O'ahu), "most people
are touched by traditional and customary practices in one way or another, even though they
don't participate directly." Il Additionally, on neighbor islands, most people (including non-
Hawaiians) continue these practices. See id.
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ing. In addition, local residents who enjoy traditional pastimes like fishing or
lei making would not have their practices protected as a matter of right.2 37
Finally, non-Hawaiians trained in Hawaiian customs, such as the hula, could
not lawfully gather the items necessary for their continued practice.3
Supporters of the bills argued that clear guidelines were necessary for
regulation.2 39 Their argument seems to suggest that lawmakers need to
determine who is entitled to continue customary practices in order to avoid
conflict and confrontation between landowners and practitioners.24
Proponents of the bills may claim that a restriction to ethnic Hawaiians is
appropriate because these traditions are rooted in Hawaiian culture. Yet, this
line of reasoning fails to consider other methods of preventing the ingenuine
exercise of custom, like managing the use as opposed to the user.
B. Restriction to Ahupua'a Tenants
Senate Bill 8 and HB 1920 also limited the exercise of traditional and
customary uses to ahupua'a tenants.4U1 Although this reservation is arguably
"' See Hearing on HB 1920, Relating to Land Use, 19th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 1 (Haw. 1997)
(testimony of Victoria Holt Takamine, Kumu Hula, Pua Ali'i Ilima) (noting that some non-
Hawaiian practitioners must be allowed to practice as a matter of right or "some of our most
valuable retainers and practitioners of Hawaiian culture, along with the knowledge they
acquired, would be lost to us") [hereinafter Holt-Takamine, HB 1920 Testimony].
238 See SB 8 Hearing, supra note 225, at I (testimony of Victoria Holt Takamine, Kumu
Hula, Pua Ali'i Ilima)[hereinafter Holt-Takamine, SB 8 Testimony]. Holt-Takamine explained
that due to increasing development "many of the areas that provided the materials for native
Hawaiian cultural practices are now either eliminated or inaccessible," and practitioners are
forced to seek out new gathering places. See id. These practitioners would be unable to trace
continued use to 1892 and thus ineligible to petition for and register their uses. Holt-Takamine
further related the negative impacts SB 8 would have on her hula halau, especially non-
Hawaiian hula students. See id.
239 See HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237, at 2 (testimony of David T. Pietsch, Executive
Vice President, Title Guaranty of Hawai'i)(noting that clear guidelines and a definition of rights
are necessary to alleviate uncertainty).
24 See id Pietsch expressed an interest in working to establish guidelines for "a defined and
efficient system in order to determine and resolve any differences as to the existence, nature and
location of such Native Rights .... Additionally, the failure to clarify the rights and
responsibilities of the native Hawaiians and the land owners will lead to conflict and
confrontation between them[.]" la
241 Although both bills limited the exercise of traditional and customary practices to
ahupua'a tenants, HB 1920 used the term "lawful occupants" of an ahupua'a. See H.R. 1920
Section 2, § 2, at 4. The Kalipi decision utilized this phrase in reference to permanent (as
opposed to temporary) residents of an ahupua'a. This specific term is notable because visitors
as well as renters-as opposed to landowners-are arguably ineligible to continue traditional
uses if considered temporary residents. See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 8, 656
P.2d 745, 749-50 (1982).
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consistent with Article XI, Section 7's phrasing, "tenants of an ahupua'a,"
any complete examination of the limitation must consider the legislative
history of the Amendment. The drafters of Article XII, Section 7 sought to
"preserve the small remaining vestiges of a quickly disappearing culture" 242
and "did not intend to have the section narrowly construed or ignored by the
courts.,,
243
The Hawai'i Supreme Court is responsible for interpreting the state
constitution.2' In Pele, the court held that "rights protected by Article XII,
Section 7 may extend beyond the ahupua'a in which a Native Hawaiian
resides where such rights have been customarily and traditionally exercised
in this manner."" Senate Bill 8 and HB 1920, therefore, contradict both the
legislative history and the court's interpretation of Article XII, Section 7,
which expanded traditional rights to non-resident tenants of an ahupua 'a.24
Additionally, neither HRS 1-1 or 7-1 contain any limitation to ahupua'a
tenants.247 As discussed above, HRS 1-1 protects established uses independ-
ent of residency. Any confusion over this issue was clarified in Pele, and later
affirmed in PASH, when the Hawai'i Supreme Court sanctioned the exercise
of traditional and customary rights by non-tenant occupants of an ahupua 'a.2"
Likewise, HRS 7-1 protects rights of access, gathering, and water, without a
residency requirement.2' House Bill 1920 and SB 8's limitation of traditional
and customary rights to ahupua'a tenants therefore imposed conditions
242 STAND. COMM. REPORT, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF HAwAI'I OF 1978 at 640 (1980).
243 Id. Article XII, Section 7's legislative history clearly exhibits the drafter's intent to
recognize and protect traditional and customary uses. In light of this background, the State's
ability to use its regulatory authority to unilaterally restrict the exercise of these rights is
questionable.
244 Interview with Jon Van Dyke, Professor of Constitutional Law, Univ. of Haw. at Manoa,
William S. Richardson Sch. of Law, in Honolulu, Haw. (Sept. 17, 1997)(explaining that state
supreme courts have primary responsibility for interpreting state constitutions). See generally
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.6c (4th ed. 199 1)(notes on review of state
laws).
245 Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 620, 837 P.2d 1247, 1272 (1992).
246 See SB 8 Hearing, supra note 225, at 3 (testimony of Malia Akutagawa, Native
practitioner and lawyer specializing in Native Hawaiian rights). Akutagawa traced the
expansion of Native Hawaiian rights from Kalipi and Pele to PASH. See also Part II.B infra,
highlighting the fact that in PASH the Court "stated that any Hawaiian shall have a right to
exercise traditional and customary practices on lands that are 'less than fully developed'
regardless of ahupua'a tenancy." Id.
247 See supra Part I.C for full text of HRS section 1-1 and section 7-1.
24' See Pele, 73 Haw. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272.
249 See supra Part I.C for full text of HRS section 7-1.
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inconsistent with the text and judicial interpretations of both statutory
provisions.25
Bill supporters again responded that guidelines were necessary to resolve
disagreements over legitimate exercises of customary rights.25" ' Furthermore,
those supporters heavily relied on the fact that Kalipi utilized a residency
requirement to prevent abuse of such rights. Specifically, the Kalipi decision
noted that the "extension of these rights to absentee landlords would be
contrary to the intention of the framers in that the right would thereby be
spread to those whose only association with the ahupua'a may be by virtue of
an economic investment." '252 Despite this reasoning, Pele clarified Kalipi to
accommodate the established practices of community access or gathering
beyond the boundaries of the ahupua 'a on the basis of HRS 1-I."'
Finally, the social and cultural impacts of a restriction to ahupua 'a tenants
are enormous.' The rapid rate of development combined with the tendency
to focus urban growth in certain sections of an island resulted in the complete
development of some ahupua 'a, while others remain relatively untouched.
Under SB 8 and HB 1920, Native Hawaiians living in fully developed areas
like Honolulu were unable to legally exercise any traditional and customary
rights. Because contemporary ahupua'a do not provide all of the products
necessary to further subsistence, religious, and cultural practices, many
practitioners go outside of their communities to gather necessary products.255
250 This Comment does not suggest that traditional and customary rights may be exercised
in an unlimited fashion. Although the specifics of this issue may not be narrowly construed by
the courts, communities may and do impose their own forms of regulation. See supra note 229.
"5 See supra notes 239-40.
252 Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 8, 656 P.2d 745, 750 (1982).
13 See SB 8 Hearing, supra note 225 (testimony of Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor,
Associate Professor in Ethnic Studies, Univ. of Haw. at Manoa, expert witness in Pele).
Professor McGregor stated that gathering and access rights must be examined in the context of
the traditions and customs perpetuated in specific communities. She further explained that in
some rural communities, gathering practices span several ahupua'a within a moku. Professor
McGregor finally noted that the scope of gathering rights was expanded in Pele because that
was the practice in Puna (the district where the case took place). See id.
254 See HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237 (testimony of Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor,
Associate Professor in Ethnic Studies, Univ. of Haw. at Manoa, Expert witness in
Pele)[hereinafter McGregor, HB 1920 testimony]. Professor McGregor gave extensive oral
testimony on the negative impacts of this regulation on native practitioners, noting in her written
testimony that "subsistence is a very important sector of Hawai'i's economy.... The Moloka'i
Subsistence Study found that on Moloka'i, 28% of the diet of all the families comes from
subsistence activities, and for Hawaiian families, 38% of their diet comes from subsistence."
I at 3. The impact of not being able to legally continue those practices would be significant
both on Moloka'i, and elsewhere in the islands.
2' See Holt-Takamine, HB 1920 Testimony, supra note 237, at 1 (Holt-Takamine explaining
that some resources are only available in certain ahupua'a, and that the bills' restriction to
ahupua'a tenants were both "ridiculous" and contrary to historical practice).
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In addition, some communities, as the Hawai'i Supreme Court recognized in
Pele, traditionally exercised customary rights beyond the boundaries of the
ahupua 'a where they reside.256 To now utilize the concept of ahupua'a to
limit the exercise of traditional and customary uses is a legal fiction that
misconstrues pre-contact understandings and ways of living.
In addition, many Native Hawaiians moved to urban areas seeking
employment or housing.257 In the event that those individuals go back to the
areas they grew up in, or visit family on other islands, they would not be
eligible to join family members in customary practices.258 Senate Bill 8 and
HB 1920 did not address or account for these problems.
C. The Definition of "Development"
Senate Bill 8 and HB 1920 restricted the exercise of traditional and
customary uses to undeveloped land. Both bills utilized similar definitions,
allowing the continuity of custom only on parcels where 1) no structures exist,
2) no improvements were made, and 3) no grading or grubbing occurred.
First, although Article XII, Section 7 authorizes the State to "regulate"
traditional and customary uses, the legislative history explains the reasons for
and extent of the State's authority. Contrary to the idea that the State may
callously regulate any exercise of customary rights, the Amendment was
actually added in response to actions by "private landowners, large corpora-
tions, ranches, large estates, hotels and government entities, 2 59 which
interfered with the exercise of traditional and customary rights. In light of
those constraints, "reasonable regulation [wa]s necessary to prevent possible
abuse as well as interference with these rights."2"
" Telephone Interview with Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor, Associate Professor in Ethnic
Studies, Univ. of Haw. at Manoa, expert witness in Pele (Dec. 18, 1997). For example in
Pelekunu and Wailau on the island of Moloka'i, members of the community went beyond the
ahupua'a to Kaluako'i in order to catch and prepare fish for the winter months. See id.
25 See HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237 (testimony of Kawika Liu, Attorney, Winer and
Meheula). Liu highlighted the fact that many Native Hawaiians are exercising traditional and
customary practices in "new areas." "mhe disease and alienation imposed by foreigners has
forced the majority of Kanaka Maoli to move away from their ancestral lands, and to practice
their customs where they find themselves living." Id. at 3.
"8 See SB 8 Hearing, supra note 225, at 1 (testimony of Ilima Morrison, Univ. of Haw. Law
Student Class of 1998)(opposing SB 8 in part because "Hawaiians who exercise the right to live
in a new ahupua'a must give up their full range of rights under State law").
259 STAND. COMM. REPORT, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONvENTION OF HAwAI'I OF 1978 at 639 (1980).
260 Id. (emphasis added). In light of the legislative history to the amendment, the State's
power to regulate traditional and customary uses is arguably limited to (1) protecting
landowners against the abuse of rights, and (2) preventing landowners from interfering with the
exercise of rights. See supra Part III.A.
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Opponents of the bills may respond that although the State is empowered
to regulate the exercise of Native Hawaiian rights it may do so only to address
potential or actual abuse.26 Because proponents of the bill never conclusively
established any such abuse, HB 1920 and SB 8 exceeded the State's regulatory
authority.262 Proponents of the bills might reply that individual entitlements
to exercise traditional and customary rights need to be explored because
difficulty in securing title insurance and other complications in selling their
property amount to abuse.263
Second, neither HRS 1-1 or 7-1 restrict the exercise of traditional and
customary practices to undeveloped land.2' 4 The Hawai'i Supreme Court in
Kalipi expressly acknowledged thatthe undeveloped land limitation "is not,
of course, found within the statute [HRS 7-1]."265 Yet the court created that
261 See SB 8 Hearing, supra note 225 (testimony of Isaac Moriwake, Univ. of Haw. Law
Student Class of 1998)(highlighting the fact that the State power to regulate traditional and
customary uses under Article XII, Section 7, should be exercised in a manner consistent with
its legislative history).
262 Several interest groups presenting testimony in opposition to the bills questioned the need
for regulation. In their testimony opposing HB 1920, Hawai'i's Thousand Friends questioned
the need for regulatory efforts, and instead suggested that title insurance companies take action
to mitigate their concerns. "We do not see how these problems get laid at the doorstep of the
PASH decision. How many 'instances' have occurred and how was it determined that the PASH
decision is responsible?" See HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237, at 1 (testimony of Hawai'i's
Thousand Friends, community action group). David Frankel of the Sierra Club likewise
questioned the need for regulation in absence of proof of the negative impacts of traditional and
customary uses, stating "[s]upporters cannot point to a single case where the PASH/Kohanaiki
case has prevented a bank from making a loan." See HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237, at 1
(testimony of David Kimo Frankel, Sierra Club - Hawai'i Chapter).
263 Almost all testimony presented in support of the bills mentioned that the "uncertainty"
of the PASH decision constrained their ability to either develop, sell, obtain title insurance, or
secure loan guarantees for their property, and urged regulation of some kind. See SB 8 Hearing,
supra note 225, at 1 (testimony of Kealakekua Dev. Corp., landowner/developer) ("As we have
made a substantial long term investment in our land in Hawai'i, it is only fair that private
property rights as well as our project plans are protected from the recent PASH decision. We
are extremely concerned that our investment, future project plans and the ability to get financing
are in great jeopardy."); HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237, at 1 (testimony of Waikoloa Land
Co., developer) ("The recent PASH decision has created uncertainty on the part of title
companies and lenders and is having a chilling effect on capital investment in real estate in
Hawai'i."); HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237, at 1 (testimony of Dan Davidson, Executive
Director, Land Use Research Foundation) ("There is serious concern among landowners and
developers as to their ability to plan, finance, and seek approvals for their projects without such
a mechanism."). See also infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
26 See HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237, at 3 (testimony of Moses Haia, Attorney, Native
Hawaiian Advisory Council)(opposing HR 1920, in part, because the extinguishment of rights
on "fully developed" land "flies in the face" of Article XII, Section 7 and HRS sections 1-1, 7-
1).
26 Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 8, 656 P.2d 745, 750 (1982).
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limitation to avoid conflict between practitioners and landowners.266 More
recently, the court in PASH declined the "temptation to place undue emphasis
on non-Hawaiian principles of land ownership[,]" 7 electing "not to scrutinize
the various gradations in property use that fall between the terms 'undevel-
oped' and 'fully developed.' 2 68 Instead, the court emphasized the need to
make determinations on a case-by-case basis.269
Opponents of the bills therefore argued that the standardized definitions for
"fully developed" and "undeveloped" failed to reflect the court's ruling that
those decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis. Bill supporters
responded that the absence of a clear definition of "fully developed" clouds
title ownership to land.27 They warned that if landowners are uncertain about
whether their parcels are subject to traditional and customary uses this
"uncertainty" could discourage investment by parties unfamiliar with the
exercise of such uses in Hawai'i"'
266 See id.
267 Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425,
450, 903 P.2d 1246, 1271 (1995).
268 id.
269 See id. at 451, 903 P.2d at 1272.
270 Much of the testimony in opposition to the bills mentioned that the unresolved nature of
traditional and customary rights following PASH clouds land title. See, e.g., HB 1920 Hearing,
supra note 237 (testimony of Gary Oliva, Senior Legal Counsel, Estate of James Campbell).
"The PASH decision raises issues for all owners of property in Hawai'i .... These uncertainties
have created title difficulties which will seriously limit efforts to use land for agriculture,
development or any significant economic use. It will make it difficult if not impossible in many
cases, to insure titles, and to finance or obtain mortgages." Id. at 1.
27 When the Hawai'i Supreme Court issued the PASH decision, land title and development
interests in the islands voiced sharp criticism. These groups disapproved of the potential
"uncertainty" the decision might impose on the land use approval process. Dan Davidson, The
PASH Decision: it's Potential Impact Upon Hawai'i's Land Use Approvals Process 61 (Dec.
8, 1995)(unpublished manuscript prepared for a Hawai'i Institute for Continuing Legal
Education Seminar, on file with author) [hereinafter Potential Impact]. Title insurance
companies and lenders expressed apprehension that individuals would "use" the rights
articulated in PASH to impede development, thereby chilling investment in Hawai'i. Telephone
interview with John Jubinsky, Title Guaranty of Hawai'i (Aug. 12, 1997); Telephone interview
with Ron Schmid, Exec. Vice Pres., Bank of Hawai'i (Aug. 13, 1997). Development interest
groups also raised concerns about the decision's impact on tourism, added difficulty in securing
title insurance and financing, and negative impacts on investment capital. See Davidson,
Potential Impact, supra at 61.
In the two years since the court issued the decision, these fears failed to manifest on the
grandiose scale predicted. Lenders and title insurance companies explain that Hawai'i's current
"economic doldrums" created a period of low development. See Jubinsky, supra this note. See
also Schmid, supra this note. Therefore, they claim the true effect of the decision has not yet
been realized. See id.
For the most part, title insurance companies deal with the application of the PASH decision
on a case-by-case basis, except with regard to residential or developed land, which are not
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Finally, the social and cultural impacts of using the proposed definition of
development are extensive.272 If land is considered "developed" when
grading, grubbing, or building permits are issued or walkways exist, many
areas where traditional and customary uses are now exercised, without harm,
will become legally unavailable. Instead of targeting problematic uses, SB 8
and HB 1920 summarily eliminate all uses in a given area, regardless of effect.
As explained in the section above, this limitation also disproportionately
impacted practitioners living in urban areas.
D. Proving Traditional and Customary Usage
The methods SB 8 and HB 1920 employed to establish a traditional and
clearly subject to traditional and customary rights. See Jubinsky, supra this note. Although
PASH rights are viewed as a potential cloud on title, individuals continue to request insurance
in spite of the possibility of future traditional and customary claims. See id. Title insurance
companies must therefore examine each application for potential claims and weigh the
likelihood that they will be exercised.
In addition, title insurance companies generally deal with traditional and customary rights
as an exception to title. See id. Thus, insurance is provided, but any claims arising under
traditional and customary rights are excluded from coverage. See id. Although insurance is
available, the possibility of future customary claims is a disincentive to many buyers and
lenders. See id. As one title insurance executive remarked, the PASH decision does not affect
the ability to insure, "the question is will lenders lend and will buyers buy?" David Pietsch,
Executive Vice President, Title Guaranty of Hawai'i, Address at Hawai'i Developers Council
forum on Perfect Title (Jul. 24, 1997).
In roughly twenty-five or thirty insurance applications reviewed by Title Guaranty with
respect to the PASH decision at the time of this interview, only four or five were rejected, about
ten or twelve were endorsed, and the remainder have not been concluded. See Jubinsky, supra
this note. While state-wide statistics are not available, Title Guaranty's experience represents
the general condition of the title industry.
Ron Schmid, Executive Vice President of Bank of Hawai'i, explained that his company has
not denied any loans for residential properties due to PASH. See Ron Schmid, Executive Vice
President, Bank of Hawai'i, Address at Hawai'i Developers Council forum on Perfect Title (Jul.
24, 1997). After stating that "PASH has not had a dramatic effect," he noted that with regard
to commercial property, Bank of Hawai'i has not had many opportunities to review the issue due
to a declining interest in development. See id.
Why potential investors have refused to invest in Hawai'i is yet unestablished and could be
associated with any number of variables. The absence of a comprehensive study on this issue
fails to support or deny the speculation that the PASH decision is responsible for Hawai'i's
decline in investment appeal. Until such documentation is available, development interests will
continue to seek some method to resolve the "substantial uncertainty" about customary rights,
while practitioners search out ways to continue their traditions.
272 See Akutagawa, supra note 246, at 4 (opposing the definition because it "serves to hinder
Hawaiian custom to the point of extinguishing it").
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customary use are difficult to reconcile with Article XII, Section 7273 The
requirement of identifying rights with respect to a specific parcel of land
conflicts with the legislative history of the constitutional provision classifying
traditional and customary uses as "personal" rights.274 Like the freedom of
speech and other fundamental rights, "[r]ather than being attached to the land,
these rights are inherently held by Hawaiians and do not come with the
land. 275 Because the legislature did not require all residents to register their
inherent rights, SB 8 and HB 1920 singled out Native Hawaiians and imposed
special hardships on them as a class.276
The requirement of tracing actual use to 1892 is also a questionable
interpretation of HRS 1_1.277 Although the Hawai'i Supreme Court deter-
mined that a custom must be established by 1892 in order to ensure protection,
it did not contemplate or require documentation of the use in question to that
date.278 It is therefore legally consistent with HRS 1-1 to prove that a custom
was generally established in practice prior to 1892 without being site-specific.
Due in part to the way Hawaiian society incorporated Western concepts of
private property, the Hawai'i Supreme Court recognized that the right "to
exercise traditional and customary practices remains intact notwithstanding
arguable abandonment of a particular site. 279 In addition, the court estab-
lished a three-point test for the doctrine of custom in Hawai'i requiring that:
1) a custom be consistent when measured against other Hawaiian customs; 2)
a practice be certain in an objective sense; and that 3) a traditional use be
exercised in a reasonable manner.280 Defining the reasonable use require-
ment, the court further explained that the balance leans in favor of establishing
a use in the sense that "even if an acceptable rationale cannot be assigned, the
custom is still recognized as long as there is no 'good legal reason' against
it." '' Senate Bill 8 and RB 1920's requirements for establishing a traditional
7 See Chang, supra note 225, at 1 (characterizing the registration and demonstration
requirements as a "fundamental misunderstanding of native Hawaiian rights").
274 See STAND. COMM. REPORT, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONvENTION OF HAWAVI OF 1978 at 639 (1980).
275 Id.
276 See Chang, supra note 225, at 1-2 (pointing out that "[liegislation that is openly directed
at burdening a specific race or ethnic group has always been the most invidious in American
history," subjecting the legislation to equal protection challenges).
277 See Akutagawa, supra note 246, at 4 (opposing SB 8, in part because the definition of
traditional and customary as pre-dating 1892 was "legally improper and inconsistent with
judicial analysis").
278 See State of Hawai'i v. Zimning, 58 Haw. 106, 116, 566 P.2d 725, 732 n.ll (1977).
279 Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425,
450, 903 P.2d 1246, 1271 (1995).
280 See id. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.39 (emphasis added).
281 Id.
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use, namely tracing site specific use to 1892, fail to comport with the three-
point test and are therefore inconsistent with the current law." 2
The social and cultural impacts of establishing that a use was traditional and
customary only added to the difficulty of the proposed process. Native
Hawaiian culture is based on oral traditions. Yet, use of the Hawaiian
language was discouraged from the 1800's into the twentieth century, and
many Hawaiians are now unable to speak their native tongue.2 3 Due in part
to this loss of language, few Native Hawaiians can trace their genealogy to
1778.84 In addition, because the traditions were oral, few if any maintained
the written documentation which the bills would have required. This lack of
written documentation, when combined with the loss of language, creates a
situation in which many Hawaiians cannot make use of the few written
sources that remain available.
Due in large part to development, many families moved from their original
kuleana, if they ever received one, and cannot establish use of a specific
parcel to 1892. In pre-contact society, maka 'ainana were "free to leave and
take up residence in another ahupua'a, thereby transferring their vested rights,
such as fishing, to a new area. '28 5 The continuous use and residency
requirements imposed by SB 8 and HB 1920 are thus inconsistent with both
Hawaiian history and the legislative intent of Article XII, Section 7, which
classifies customary rights as "personal." Native Hawaiian rights are firmly
rooted in Hawai'i's culture and history.286 Legislators did not invent Article
XII, Section 7 and HRS 1-1 and 7-1 on the eve of statehood or in the
Constitutional Convention. These principles are the direct result of back-
ground principles of property law in these islands.287 Current interpretations
282 See Akutagawa, supra note 246, at 2-3 (Akutagawa argued that SB 8 was "inconsistent
with judicial precedents and statutory and constitutional guarantees," and asserted that it failed
to comport with Kalipi, Pele, and PASH).
283 Missionaries heavily promoted the use of English: adopting it as the language of
instruction, closing Hawaiian language schools, and eventually adopting English as the only
official language in 1896. See HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER:
COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I 21, 81 (1993).
284 Many Native Hawaiians who testified in opposition to the bills explained that they would
not be able to provide proof of their Hawaiian descent prior to 1778. See SB 8 Hearing, supra
note 225 (testimony Victoria Holt-Takamine, Kumu Hula, Pua Ali'i Ilima noting that she, like
many others, cannot trace her geneaology to 1778).
285 STAND. COMM. REPORT, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTIUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF HAWAI'I OF 1978 at 640 (1980).
286 See HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237 (testimony of Hayden Aluli, Native Hawaiian
rights attorney). Alului traced the evolution of Hawaiian rights from the institution of private
property in Hawai'i--the Mahele of 1848--to the present day. See id. at 3-9.
287 See COMM. OF THE WHOLE DEBATES, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTrr=tIONALCONVErTIONOFHAWAI'I OF 1978 at 436 (1980)("he rights we wish to protect
are listed statutorily. These traditional and customary rights did not fall out of heaven into our
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must respect and reflect that unique history.
Supporters of SB 8 and HB 1920 responded that the expeditious resolution
of claims requires objective criteria.2 s8 In light of the many unresolved issues
in PASH, they argued for guidelines "which w[ould] permit those Native
Hawaiians who rightfully possess these rights and all landowners to have a
defined and efficient system in order to determine and resolve any differences
as to the existence, nature and location of such Native Hawaiian Rights."289
Arguably, some criterion are necessary to determine whether a use is
customary, such as establishing continued usage on a specific site. But,
according to proponents, this process of determination assumed that
traditional and customary rights would not be available in the same extent as
pre-contact society.290 Those arguments are difficult to justify, however, in
light of both legislative intent and judicial interpretation: the protection of
traditional and customary rights is "necessary to insure the survival of those
who in 1851, sought to live in accordance with the ancient ways. They thus
remain, to the extent provided in the statute, available to those who wish to
continue those ways."'29'
E. Comparing Administrative and Judicial Adjudication of Claims
1. SB 8's administrative resolution of claims
While SB 8 and HB 1920 employed many of the same concepts, their
methods of regulation differed. Senate Bill 8 proposed that the Land Use
Commission resolve Native Hawaiian claims and issue certificates if it were
to determine that an applicant established a traditional and customary use.2"
Meanwhile, individuals could not legally exercise customary practices without
laps while we were having committee deliberations."); See HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237,
at 2 (testimony of Alan Murakami, Attorney, Native Hawaiian Legal Corp., testifing that
traditional and customary rights themselves "existed both before and after the creation of
Hawai'i's system of private property in 1848").
288 See also HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237, at 2, (testimony of Robin Sagadraca,
President, Hawai'i Land Title Association, explaining that guidelines should be developed to
aid in the determination of whether a use is protected).
289 Pietsch, supra note 239, at 2.
290 See also HB 1920 Hearing, supra note 237 at 1 (testimony of Thos Rohr, President,
Hawai'i Resort Developers Conference, noting that it is necessary to include "specific
exclusions for lands to which claims are not appropriate").
291 Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425,
439, 903 P.2d 1246, 1260 (1995)(quoting Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 8-9, 656
P.2d 745, 749-50 (1982)(citation omitted)).
292 See SB 8 § 205B(a), at 4.
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such a certificate.293 The imposition of that condition would immediately alter
the status and practice of traditional and customary rights, thus subjecting SB
8 to due process challenges.
Both the state and federal constitutions prohibit government bodies from
denying citizens life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.2 94
These provisions provide substantive guarantees that individuals will not be
deprived of an interest without the opportunity to present a defense.295
Procedural protections are also mandated to ensure that rights will not be
unfairly divested.296 The inability to legally exercise traditional and customary
uses until a hearing is held, and the extinguishment of rights if a practitioner
did not respond to or complete the claims process, would thus violate due
process. 2
97
In addition, the procedure for determining and registering traditional and
customary rights did not provide adequate assurances that those rights would
not be unjustly extinguished. In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court
articulated a three-part test to determine the constitutional sufficiency of a
process. 29' To satisfy this test, claimants must determine: 1) if private
interests are at stake; 2) the risk of erroneous decisions compared with the
probable value of additional safeguards; and 3) the scope of the government's
interest.2' Because the traditional and customary rights of Native Hawaiians
are targeted by SB 8, the first element of the test is satisfied. Moreover, the
Land Commission does not have sufficient expertise to consider the intricate
legal and social principles necessary to determine whether a use is protected,
which creates a significant risk of erroneous decisions, and satisfies the
second prong of the Mathews test.' Although the government has an interest
in protecting and regulating customary rights, the possible effect of recent
court decisions did not create a government interest sufficient to justify the
293 See id.
294 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; HAW. CoNST. art. I, § 5.
29' See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
296 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
297 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261 (privileges may be terminated only after a hearing on the
merits of a claim). Several individuals presenting testimony in opposition to SB 8 cautioned
the Committee about due process violations. See Henkin, supra note 225, at 1 (opposing SB
8 due in part to due process concerns).
298 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
299 See id.
300 See also SB 8 Hearing, supra note 225 (testimony of Esther Ueda, Chair, Hawai'i Land
Use Comm.). Ueda presented oral testimony in opposition to SB 8 specifically stating that the
Commission lacked both the resources and expertise to adjudicate contested case hearings on
traditional and customary rights.
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enormous fiscal and administrative burdens of the proposed process .3o' Since
Native Hawaiians risk losing their traditional and customary rights perma-
nently, a fair and expedited process is absolutely necessary.' Senate Bill 8's
substantive and procedural inadequacies thus make it constitutionally
unacceptable.3 3
In addition to due process, the Federal and State Constitutions also prohibit
the taking of property without just compensation.3 4 Property is considered
"taken" if it is permanently and physically occupied by the government or
regulated to a point where the landowner is deprived of all economically
beneficial use of that parcel. 305 Landowners in Hawai'i may therefore argue
that State protections for traditional and customary practices are equivalent to
a regulatory taking.
In evaluating the takings argument, several factors must be considered.
First, the right of practitioners to reasonably access and/or gather on a specific
parcel of undeveloped land does not deprive an owner of "all economically
beneficial use.,'3 ' The Hawai'i Supreme Court first stated in Kalipi, and
again noted in PASH, that "Article XII, Section 7 does not require the
preservation, 37 of lands where traditional and customary practices occur.
Since the protection of traditional and customary uses by the state constitution
does not require that lands remain undeveloped, landowners cannot establish
that Article XII, Section 7 deprives them of all beneficial use.30 s
Second, the United States Supreme Court recognized two situations that
will never amount to a regulatory taking: 1) the regulation of nuisances; and
2) regulations that were "part of a state's background principles of real
property. ' '3 9 Traditional and customary uses are the genesis of Hawai'i's
301 Despite the perceived impact of the PASH decision, testimony in opposition to SB 8 and
HB 1920 failed to present statistics or studies conclusively establishing negative impacts
resulting from the decision.
302 See Henkin, supra note 225, at 1 (expressing concern that the procedure proposed to
reconcile traditional and customary rights would result in depriving practitioners of their
constitutional rights).
303 See id.
304 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 20.
31 See David L. Callies, After Lucas and Dolan: An Introductory Essay in TAKINGS: LAND-
DEVELOPMENT CONDImoNS AN REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LucAs 3-25 (David
Callies ed., 1996).
" See generally id.
31 Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425,
451,903 P.2d 1246, 1272 (1995).
308 See Chang, supra note 225, at 2-3 (testifying that traditional and customary rights could
not amount to a regulatory taking).
31 Callies, supra note 305, at 5.
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background principles of real property. a0 Hawai'i Revised Statutes 1-1 and
7-1, and Article XII, Section 7 simply reflect concepts of pre-contact land
tenure, codified by the Kingdom, Provisional Government, Territory, and now
by the State of Hawai'i. Traditional and customary usage is not merely a
background principle, it supersedes other Western principles of property in
Hawai'i.3 In holding that the recognition of traditional and customary rights
did not constitute a judicial taking, the court in PASH explained that a takings
claim placed "undue reliance on western understanding of property law that
are not universally applicable in Hawai'i.,112 Finally, should the Land Use
Commission modify or terminate traditional and customary practices, it would
have to establish that such action was necessary to further a compelling state
interest, or compensate practitioners for taking their traditional and customary
rights.
3 13
Article XII, Section 7 requires the State to reaffirm and protect "all rights,
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious
purposes[" '3 4 While this provision allows limited regulation,315 "the State
does not have the unfettered discretion to regulate the rights of ahupua'a
tenants out of existence. 31 6 Because SB 8's definition of undeveloped land
extinguished a practitioner's ability to continue practices on certain types of
property, it blatantly contradicted the court's mandate of protection. In
addition, the authorization of the Land Commission to terminate certain
traditional and customary uses was equally inconsistent with the constitutional
mandate.
311 See Chang, supra note 225, at 2 ("Hawai'i law has always incorporated traditional and
customary law .... Thus, there is no question that the incorporation of Hawaiian values in the
property law of this State has been the fundamental basis for the interpretation of property
law.").
311 See HAW. REv. STAT. § 1-1 (subordinating English and American common law to
traditional and customary usage).
312 PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 451,903 P.2d at 1272.
313 See Relating to Land Use: Hearing on SB 8 Before the Senate Comm. on Water, Land
and Hawaiian Affairs, 19th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. 9 (Haw. 1997)(testimony of Hayden Alului,
Native Hawaiian rights attorney). Alului analogized traditional and customary rights to property
interests, arguing that "[iln its purported attempt to 'regulate' these native tenant and native
Hawaiian rights, it [the legislative proposal] actually takes them by relegating them to mere
privileges and/or licenses. And that is an unconstitutional taking." Id. There is currently an
ongoing discussion on the status of traditional and customary rights. Neither the court nor the
community decided whether to categorize these rights as "personal" or "property."
314 HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.
315 See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
316 PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 451, 903 P.2d at 1272.
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The social and cultural impacts of SB 8's method of regulating traditional
and customary uses were also administratively burdensome and expensive." 7
The fiscal and logistical burdens of administering the registration process are
colossal if every Native Hawaiian registered every right that she or he
exercises with respect to every piece of property affected. If each Hawaiian
petitioned for five or ten uses, the Commission would have to adjudicate
hundreds of thousands of contested case hearings. Should either the
practitioner or landowner have had to appeal the Commission's decision to the
courts through the Hawai'i Administrative Procedure Act,3"' this process of
gaining "assurance of title" would be even more arduous.
It was also questionable whether the Land Commission was the proper body
to adjudicate claims.319 One of the Commission's directives is to "preserve,
protect and encourage the development of land.., for.., uses for which they
are best suited."3" Since SB 8 limited Native Hawaiian rights to undeveloped
land, the registration and preservation of those rights would pose a serious
conflict of interest for a Commission directed with facilitating development.
At the February 4 hearing, Esther Ueda, Chair of the LUC, testified in
opposition to SB 8, explaining that the Commission lacked the budget and
expertise to adjudicate traditional claims.321
Finally, the need to register all customary rights is questionable.322 Not all
landowners view traditional and customary rights as an encumbrance on title
or wish to know what, if any, uses practitioners are exercising on their
property. Instead of assuming the time and expense of the registration process
proposed by SB 8, it is more appropriate to place the burden of establishing
the non-existence of traditional and customary uses on landowners seeking
such clarification.
2. HB 1920's judicial resolution of claims
House Bill 1920's creation of a judicial cause of action as opposed to a
registration scheme, subjected it to the same constitutional challenges as SB
317 See Holt-Takamine, SB 8 Testimony, supra note 238, at 1 (cautioning about excessive
burden and expense).
318 See supra note 181 for a description of HRS section 91.
319 See SB 8 Hearing, supra note 225, at 2, (testimony of Denise Antolini, Casey Jarman,
and Malia Akutagawa, Univ. of Haw. Envtl. Ctr., questioning the propriety of the Commission
to adjudicate customary claims).
320 Perry v. Planning Comm'n of County of Hawai'i, 62 Haw. 666,674-75, 619 P.2d 95, 102
(1980)(citing section 1 of Act 187: findings and declaration of purpose).
321 See Ueda, supra note 300.
322 See HN 1920 Hearing, supra note 237, at 2 (testimony of Kina'u Boyd Kamali'i, Native
Hawaiian)(remarking that "legislative efforts to limit, restrict, or regulate the PASH ruling are
premature and ill-advised").
1998 1 THE BACKLASH AGAINST PASH
8. Because HB 1920 empowered judges to issue decrees modifying and/or
extinguishing traditional and customary practices if practitioners did not
respond to newspaper notices, the bill contained due process violations similar
to SB 8. However, the fact that HB 1920 charged circuit courts, as opposed
to the Land Commission, with determining whether or not a right existed may
have provided sufficient procedural safeguards to absolve the bill from
procedural due process challenges. Nonetheless, the ability of the courts to
modify or terminate rights could trigger the same takings claims discussed in
relation to SB 8.323
Despite some similarities between the bills, this analysis must consider
additional social impacts created by HB 1920.324 Because Native Hawaiians
have the lowest socio-economic status of all ethnic groups in the state, most
lacking even the financial resources to initiate and/or pursue a court action,
HB 1920 disadvantaged Native Hawaiian petitioners and landowners of lower
socio-economic status, and would have resulted in claims being settled by
individuals who could afford to pursue traditional and customary rights as
opposed to those who were entitled to them.
Senate Bill 8 and HB 1920's attempt to regulate the exercise of traditional
and customary uses under Article XII, Section 7 was both legally and socially
insufficient. Although the bills ostensibly sought to protect the exercise of
traditional and customary rights while providing additional security for
landowners, they resulted in the reduction or elimination of rights with
negligible benefits. In light of the fact that the legislative backlash against
PASH is likely to resume in future sessions, and that significant human and
financial resources are necessary to pursue case-by-case determinations, an
examination of two other bills introduced during the 1997 session provide
examples of amenable alternatives.
323 The creation of a cause of action with such widespread application would also add to the
already existing backlog in the courts. See supra text accompanying note 317.
324 See McGregor, HB 1920 Testimony, supra note 254, at 3. Professor McGregor also
expressed concern that many Hawaiians who continue to exercise traditional customs would not
complete the claims process and therefore would be disadvantaged:
Those persons who have continued to exercise Hawaiian custom and practices live on the
margins of our society.... They continued to live in rural areas, fishing, hunting,
gathering, and cultivating as their ancestors before them. They are mistrustful of
outsiders. Many do not regularly read the paper. Some may not have telephones. This
whole process would repeat the injustice of the Mahele back in 1848-50 when 72 percent
of those eligible to be granted a land award failed to even petition for the lands upon
which they lived and cultivated.
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VI. EQUITABLE REGULATORY EFFORTS
Senate Bill 454 ("SB 454") and House Bill 1536 ("HB 1536") attempted to
reconcile traditional and customary rights with contemporary land use through
a public access provision and cultural impact statement. Instead of creating
a system for defining and regulating current uses, both bills attempted to
preserve existing rights where the status or use of land was about to be altered
via State approval.
Senate Bill 454 proposed an amendment to HRS section 198-D, Hawai'i's
statewide trail and access system.323 Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 198-D
pertains to Na Ala Hele, a statewide board to manage all trails and accesses in
the islands.326 The State Department of Land and Natural Resources is
charged with coordinating and implementing the system, including acquiring
both the property and easements necessary for public access.327
Senate Bill 454 proposed the addition of a new chapter conditioning any
State or county-level land use approval on the provision of public access.328
Before amendments to district boundaries, development or community plans,
zoning changes, permits, or use approvals could be granted, the agency would
have had to "ensure that public access by right-of-way or easement was
provided free and unimpeded to the shoreline, mountain, or other recreational,
cultural, or natural resource."329 Public notice of the access and parking would
also have been required.33
Senate Bill 454 provided a pragmatic approach to ensure access for both
traditional and nontraditional uses. It complied with constitutional and
statutory mandates while avoiding due process and equal protection chal-
lenges. By protecting uses as opposed to individuals, SB 454 also respected
the Hawai'i Supreme Court's interpretation of HRS 1-1 without imposing
standards on issues where the court reserved judgment, for example, the issue
of which individuals are eligible to exercise protected uses under that statute.
This approach was also socially practical and less costly because it
incorporated the access provision into an already existing system of review.
Instead of requiring the registration or adjudication of all uses upon risk of
extinguishment, this bill guaranteed public access when a landowner sought
to change the current designation or use of a parcel. Such limited application
allowed cooperative understandings between landowners and practitioners to
325 HAW. REv. STAT. § 198D-2 (1995).
326 See id.
327 See id. See also id. § 198D(8)-(9).
328 See S. 454: Relating to Land Use, 19th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997).
329 Id. Section 2(a)-(b).
330 See id. Section 2(a).
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remain intact and focused a community's time and resources on changes in
existing relationships.
Finally, SB 454 was culturally appropriate because it declined to impose
undue restrictions on the individuals entitled to continue traditional practices
and the areas available for use. By protecting established "uses" as opposed
to "users," this proposal provided the flexibility necessary for the continued
evolution of Hawaiian culture in an evolving society.
A second alternative for protecting traditional and customary uses was the
incorporation of cultural impacts into environmental assessments ("EA") and
environmental impact statements ("EIS"). Hawai'i Revised Statutes section
343 provides a system of review to-ensure that environmental concerns are
adequately considered in agency decision making.33' House Bill 1536 sought
to amend HRS section 343 by adding Native Hawaiian culture and resources
as a criteria for evaluating the social and environmental impacts of proposed
actions requiring state or county approval, adoption, or funding.332
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 343 requires state and county agencies to
prepare an EA for proposed uses of state or county lands or funds, or uses
proposed in conservation districts, shoreline areas, historic sites and other
designated areas, with some exceptions.333 If, after making a written
evaluation of the projected impacts of the use, an agency finds that the
proposed action "may have a significant effect on the environment" the
agency must prepare an EIS.33 If the agency finds that the proposal will not
have a significant impact on the environment, an EIS is not required.335
An EIS is a comprehensive assessment of the environmental, social, and
economic impacts of a proposed action, including methods to mitigate any
adverse effects.336 Because acceptance of a final EIS is necessary for agency
33' HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-1 (1995).
332 See H.R. 1536: Relating to Native Hawaiian Cultural Impact Statements, 19th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997). The Senate counterpart to HB 1536 was SB 1218. See also HAW.
REV. STAT. § 343-5.
333 HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-5(a)-(b). This section requires environmental assessments for
a proposed (1) use of state or county lands or funds (with some exceptions), (2) use of land in
a conservation district designated by HRS section 205, (3) use within a shoreline area, (4) use
in a historic site, (5) use within the Waikiki area of O'ahu, (6) amendments to existing county
general plans resulting in designations other than agriculture, conservation or preservation, (7)
reclassification of conservation land, or (8) construction or modification of helicopter facilities.
Id. § 343-5(a). The public is allowed to review and comment on both a draft and final EA or
EIS. See id. § 343-5(b).
334 Id § 343-5(b). Although the agency responsible for approving, adopting, or funding a
proposed use must complete the EA or EIS, the applicant usually completes the evaluations and
submits them to the agency for approval. Telephone Interview with Jan Thirugnanam, Planner,
Office of Environmental Quality Control (Oct. 3, 1997).
335 See id. § 343-5(c).
336 See id. § 343-2. Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 343-2 defines an EIS as an
informational document which discloses the "environmental effects of a proposed action, effects
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funding or approval,337 the criteria used in evaluating a proposed use directly
impacts an agency's approval or rejection of that application. If the legislature
had adopted HB 1536, agencies would have been required to consider the
impacts of all actions requiring an EA or EIS on Hawaiian culture and
resources as part of the environmental review process.
House Bill 1536 would have been effective in preserving both customary
uses and the resources necessary to continue those practices. This bill there-
fore comported with Article X1I, Section 7 and HRS 1-i's protection of
custom. House Bill 1536 was also socially appropriate in the sense that it
incorporated an examination of protected uses into an existing process
structured to assess the social and environmental effects of proposed actions.
Like SB 454, HB 1536 initiated review only at the behest of a landowner
seeking to change an existing use or designation. This provision allowed for
some community self-regulation while ensuring protection of traditional and
customary uses. Finally, HB 1536 was culturally appropriate because it
protected established uses without imposing undue restrictions on the
practitioner's ethnicity and residency.338
Both SB 454 and HB 1536 presented workable alternatives for complying
with the State's statutory and constitutional protections for traditional and
customary uses. They are not perfect solutions, as communities will ultimately
have to come together and address the needs and concerns of both practitio-
ners and landowners in their own contexts. Senate Bill 454 and RB 1536 do,
however, represent alternative legislative methods of addressing issues
relating to traditional and customary rights while minimizing social and
cultural impacts and without circumventing years of carefully developed
judicial precedent.
of a proposed action on the economic and social welfare of the community and State, effects of
the economic activities arising out of the proposed action, measures proposed to minimize
adverse effects, and alternatives to the action and their environmental effects." Id. An EIS must
also comply with rules adopted by the State Office of Environmental Quality Control See HAW.
ADMIN. R. § 11-200 (1996) See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-2. An EIS is much more detailed
than an EA.
337 See id. § 343-5(c).
338 After the Hawai'i Supreme Court decided PASH, the Office of Environmental Quality
Control ("OEQC") an agency responsible for overseeing administration of HRS section 343,
promulgated draft rules including provisions for cultural impact statements similar to those
proposed by HB 1536. Telephone Interview with Jan Thirugnanam, Planner, OEQC (Oct. 3,
1997). However, Governor Ben Cayetano refused to approve the draft rules on the grounds that
the legislature was the appropriate body to address the issue. See id After the legislature failed
to take action on the issue for the second year in a row, OEQC decided to take advisory action
and released a guideline for assessing cultural impacts in September, 1997. See id. The OEQC
accepted public comments on the draft guidelines until October 8, 1997, and was expected to
release the final guidelines shortly thereafter. See id.
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VIl. CONCLUSION
The regulatory efforts presented in SB 8 and HB 1920 fell short of the legal
standards established by Article XII, Section 7 of the State Constitution, and
HRS 1-1 and 7-1. Legislative attempts to clarify and regulate traditional and
customary uses through both bills substantially deviated from both the
historical background and contemporary practice of those rights. In addition,
the bills application of private property concepts did not adequately consider
Hawai'i's unique history or its concepts relating to land tenure and property
ownership.
Both bills viewed traditional and customary rights as an encumbrance on
title. This characterization was unjustified in light of the Hawai'i Supreme
Court's ruling that the "issuance of a Hawaiian land patent confirmed a
limited property interest as compared with typical land patents governed by
Western concepts of property." '339 The court's conclusion that the "Western
concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawai'i, '3 40 further
diminished the legitimacy of any State objective in promulgating SB 8 or HB
1920.
Because a landowner's ability to exclude others from its property was never
firmly established in Hawai'i, SB 8 and HB 1920 attempted to address an
issue that Hawai'i's courts and legislature had already resolved. Although
access for traditional and customary uses may conflict with some landowner's
misconceptions of what their rights are, such contentions are based on
personal and intellectual philosophies, not on legal rights.
Instead of regulating traditional and customary uses, a more effective
approach to calming the backlash may be to educate landowners about what
certificates of title in Hawai'i actually convey. This is not to suggest that
traditional and customary uses are beyond all regulation, or that landowners
are unjustified in feeling upset if they are mistaken. This Comment merely
proposes that title holders recognize the established limitations to land patents
in Hawai'i, and stop fueling the backlash against PASH.
D. Kapua Sproat34'1
33 Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425,
447, 903 P.2d 1246, 1268 (1995).
34 Id.
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